It is a campaign to end allegiance to Westminster politicians that promote and/or tolerate austerity and the accelerating privatisation of the NHS and other national assets.
Rising anger against the establishment has mobilised support behind the campaign for Scottish independence. We share this anger and believe the Scots are right to challenge both the above, and also the narrow focus of Britain’s politicians on, e.g., voters in marginal seats.
But the uprising is led by a political party (the SNP) whose campaign will lead to Scottish subordination to the British state on the one hand, and to multinational corporations on the other. And make no mistake: the SNP’s determination to fragment the British state—even if achieved peacefully and even if it were possible to define a Scottish government as progressive—ultimately serves the interests of footloose finance capital more than those of the Scottish people.
The currency question
The SNP seems to have ruled out an independent Scottish currency and central bank, which we and other economists recommend as the only solution consistent with sovereignty and independence—even if it, too, is a risky strategy for a country of less than five million taxpayers.
The SNP’s commitment to a currency union with Britain, as many have argued, is a commitment to subordinate Scottish economic independence to the control of the British Treasury and the Bank of England (BoE). As the Governor of the BoE Mark Carney repeatedly says: a currency union is not compatible with sovereignty.
Under a currency union, the Bank of England and Treasury will influence and shape the exchange rate of Scotland’s currency (sterling) and Scotland’s interest rates. Furthermore, the British Treasury will insist on final control over an independent Scotland’s taxation and spending policies, and the management of its public debt. Scotland can today have some say over Treasury policies. An independent Scotland in a monetary union will have no say.
Post-independence, 59 million British taxpayers will not be willing to guarantee, via the BoE, the bank deposits of 5 million Scottish citizens. The BoE will no longer regulate, manage or lend to Scottish banks. As a result and over time, money will flow out of Scottish banks, bankruptcy will loom, so banks will quickly migrate their HQs to London, to flout free market ideology and seek protection from losses from British taxpayers. Continue reading… ›
In this carefully researched book, Ed Conway tells a gripping human tale about the July 1944 Bretton Woods Conference – “the biggest battle of the Second World War – fought behind closed doors”. He provides remarkable insights into the personal, geopolitical and intellectual dynamics that played out that summer within the confines of the Mount Washington Hotel, nestled within New Hampshire’s Bretton Woods.
His story of how 730 delegates from 44 nations worked together to build the post-war international monetary system is a highly readable account of a gathering that was to transform the global economy. Pivotal to the success of the conference was President Roosevelt’s and Keynes’s determination to bar Wall St. and the City of London from participating in preparations for the conference; and to deny the private finance sector (with one exception) access to the conference proceedings. After the catastrophic economic failures of the 1930s Haute Finance was to be denied a role in the construction of the post-war international economic order.
The book details the well-known tensions that arose both before and after the conference between the US Treasury’s Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes, representing Britain. As importantly Conway reveals “the surprising influence of China, Brazil and India” but also the significant role that Russia played at Bretton Woods. Conway is the first to consult Russian Finance Ministry archives on the part played by the Soviets at Bretton Woods; files made available to researchers at the end of the Cold War but never before used.
Conway explores the controversy surrounding Harry Dexter White’s supposed collusion with the Soviet authorities during the negotiations. He shares a growing consensus that as late as 1946
“the general opinion in Washington was that ‘Stalin has been our best friend’…In other words, there simply was not during this period the stigma attached to dealing with the Soviets that developed over the following years…White simply viewed his interactions with the Russians as a means of carrying out broader American foreign policy – without having to go through the odious State Department.” (p.162)
The Bretton Woods conference is often relegated in importance to the summits held at Yalta and Potsdam. Conway writes that:
“For some reason, while it remains one of economics’ few household names, Bretton Woods is frequently ignored in accounts of the period.” Continue reading… ›
In a recent paper, ‘Money creation in the modern economy’ Bank of England staff explained that:
‘[B]anks do not act simply as intermediaries, lending out deposits that savers place with them, and nor do they ‘multiply up’ central bank money to create new loans and deposits … Commercial banks create money, in the form of bank deposits, by making new loans.’
Because there is widespread confusion about the role of banks in creating money, it did not take long for the Bank of England’s report to ignite debate on the comment pages of the Financial Times. In his regular column, Martin Wolf called for private banks to be stripped of their power to create money. 
Wolf’s proposals are radical, and would give a small committee – independent of the state – a monopoly on money creation. His ideas are based on the Chicago Plan, advanced among others by Irving Fisher in the 1930s, and shared today by the UK NGO, Positive Money. They agree that all ‘decisions on money creation would … be taken by a committee independent of government’.
Furthermore, Wolf argues, private commercial banks would only be allowed to:
‘…loan money actually invested by customers. They would be stopped from creating such accounts out of thin air and so would become the intermediaries that many wrongly believe they now are.’
Because I am a vocal critic of the private finance sector, many assume that I would agree with Wolf and Positive Money on nationalising money creation. Not so.
I have no objection to the nationalisation of banks. But nationalising banks is a different proposition from nationalising (and centralising) money creation in the hands of a small ‘independent committee’. Indeed, the notion to my mind is preposterous. It is an approach reminiscent of the misguided and failed monetarist policy prescriptions for controlling the money supply in the 1980s.
Second, the proposal that only money already saved should be made available for lending assumes that money exists as a consequence of economic activity, and equals savings. But that is to get things the wrong way around. Rather, it is credit that functions as money, and it is credit that creates economic activity and employment. Deposits and/or savings are the consequence of the creation of credit and its role in stimulating investment and employment. Employment, as we all know from our own experience, generates income – wages, salaries, profits and tax revenues. A share of this income can then be set aside as savings.
To restrict all economic activity to savings would be to contract economic activity to an ever-diminishing sum of existing savings. Furthermore, the restriction of all lending to existing savings would lead to higher rates of interest, because the level of savings is much lower than the level of potential economic activity and employment. Savers would be in a position to demand a higher return on the loan of their savings. This would return society to the dark ages, when investment and economic activity was subject to the whims of great feudal landowners, putting the financial elite in control of society’s surpluses or ‘savings’.
Money in an historical context As Douglas Coe and I explain in a recent PRIME report, the UK monetary system – complete with the power to create money ‘out of thin air’ – was established back in 1694 with the goal, among others, of facilitating commercial transactions and the financing of the king’s wars. But there was an additional and just as important goal: to mimic the Dutch in reducing the rate of interest facing commercial interests. British firms, households and individuals were keen to bring rates down and into line with those that prevailed in the financially more advanced Netherlands. Lower rates made investment and employment viable. Continue reading… ›
Because of the finance sector’s despotic power, about which I have been very vocal, many readers would expect me to support a proposal that prevents private banks from creating money, and to enthusiastically back the nationalization of money issuance. I do not however, and want to explain why.
While Wolf has helped bring the role of private bankers in “printing” most of the money in circulation to public attention, the proposal he advances is deeply flawed. It is not very different from the monetarist or neoclassical understanding of money, as based on a commodity. As such his proposal, like the Chicago Plan, would contract and restrict economic activity – to the level of existing savings. That is why the Chicago Plan was so enthusiastically endorsed by monetarists like Milton Friedman.
To understand why the plan is flawed, one has to first understand that credit is nothing more than a promise to repay, as Schumpeter once argued. Furthermore, the issuance of credit results in deposits, or bank money, as Wolf argues.
Credit or money created by banks does not necessarily correspond to what we understand as income. Nor does it correspond to savings. It does not correspond to any economic activity. The one-to-one link that existed between commodity money and economic activity in the Middle Ages does not exist in today’s banking system. Instead credit merely facilitates transactions – and in that way creates economic activity – investment, employment and income. Continue reading… ›
The fact is Britain’s dependency on external sources of energy means that we are dangerously exposed to this crisis – at a time when North Sea Oil and Gas production has fallen by over 20% since the Coalition government took office.
And while Russia supplies only a small percentage of Britain’s natural gas, the crisis has the potential to drive the price of carbon fuels higher. Brent crude is already at a high for 2014. Further tensions and conflict in Eastern Europe could trigger even higher rises in gas and oil prices.
To compound this threat, Britain has one of the lowest shares of alternative energy supplies in Europe. Renewables form just 4.3% of our energy mix, a figure just a little higher than that for tiny Malta and Luxembourg. By comparison renewable sources of energy in Germany and France form about 12-13% of the energy mix.
The Chancellor should therefore use the opportunity of the Budget to address this grave threat to Britain’s security; to invest to urgently diversify Britain’s energy mix; and to achieve greater energy efficiency.
Such investment is sorely needed. In Q4 2013, total investment (public and private) was still 1.3% below the 2010 figure. Business investment has finally started a modest increase, and is up 1.5% on the 2010 figure. But government Gross Fixed Capital Formation or investment is down a huge 9.3%. (And despite all the media interest in the housing bubble, housing investment (which includes maintenance etc. as well as new build) is up just 1.4%.)
As many economists have argued, the Chancellor could finance such urgently needed investment at historically unprecedented low rates of interest. Such low-cost public investment in energy infrastructure would achieve five important economic, energy and environmental goals.
First it would provide greater energy security to Britain’s households and firms.
Second, investment in greater efficiency would lead to cost savings for both households and firms.
Third, alternative sources of energy could help reduce Britain’s carbon emissions, which in turn destabilize the climate.
Fourth, such investment in alternative and more efficient energy would lead to the creation of local, skilled, and higher-paid jobs.
Fifth, the income from such jobs would generate the tax revenues needed to repay the government’s low-cost borrowing.
This is the win-win economic and energy strategy first proposed by the Green New Deal Group in our ground-breaking report launched back in 2008.
The Ukraine crisis exposes the failures of Britain’s economic and energy model; a model based on high levels of private debt fuelling asset bubbles; disproportionate consumption; energy inefficiency and dependency, trade imbalances and chronic low investment.
The first task of any government is to plan for, and defend the security, including the energy security, of its citizens. As a leading member of this government, the Chancellor has a duty to plan for, and defend both the economic and the energy security of Britain’s households and firms. The Green New Deal is the plan his Budget should confirm today.
This text was originally published by the Center for Labour and Social Studies (CLASS).
… In a debate with Fraser Nelson of the Spectator on the BBC´s Daily Politics programme on 24th June, 2014. Even a gradual rise in the bank´s base rate would put around 2.3 million households at risk. Marginal increases in household incomes make debtors highly vulnerable to any additional borrowing costs. Pettifor also said that a rise in rates would be particularly harmful for those on low incomes that had been actively encouraged to take out high loan-to-value mortgages by the government’s Help to Buy scheme. Watch the full interview on BBC.
To salvage the private banking system taxpayer-backed central banks intervened in ways that were (and remain) spectacular and historically unprecedented. Extraordinary monetary and other measures were and are still taken to bail out the finance sector’s big losers: reckless private bankers and financiers. Central bankers created trillions of dollars ‘out of thin air’ and used it to finance private bank bailouts. They went further: they lowered central bank base rates of interest charged to bankers – and have kept those rates extraordinarily low for almost six years – to slash the cost of borrowing for private bankers.
Governments too bent over backwards to save bankers. They amplified the extraordinary largesse of their central banks by extending taxpayer-backed guarantees against losses. These guarantees hauled global banks back from the brink of bankruptcy.
The result is a global casino in which the vast majority of taxpayers lose, and a favoured few continue with business as-better-than usual. And it’s one in which, despite the catastrophic failure of 2007-9 and its consequences, the finance sector continues to make unprecedented and unexpected gains.
At the same time the global economy persists in a state of weakness and stagnation: what Martin Wolf of the FT calls “a contained depression.” Unemployment across the world remains high and in some countries is higher than during the depression of the 1930s. Global financial imbalances persist – with countries like China and Germany building up surpluses, and others like the US and UK persisting with trade and capital account deficits. Fiscal deficits exploded after the crisis, as a result of rising unemployment, a collapse in tax revenues and bank bailouts. Social and political upheavals are inevitable. And, as the recent emerging market instability revealed, the global financial system remains wildly volatile and unpredictable. Most worrying of all: the threat of deflation stalks the Eurozone and beyond.
There are three lessons from this experience. Continue reading… ›
Britain’s economy grew at the fastest rate last year since before the financial crisis but output dipped in the final quarter of 2013, official data showed on Tuesday. Chancellor George Osborne said that overall, the data was “more evidence that our long-term economic plan is working”. Voice of Russia asked me if the chancellor was right to be optimistic.
Listen to the full interview here.
I recently published “Just Money – How to Break the Despotic Power of Finance” (Commonwealth Publishing, 2014). RT TV kindly asked me to summarise my arguments in their show “Boom and Bust”.
To listen to the full interview please click here.
You can also download Just Money for £2.99 at www.primeeconomics.org