Archive for the ‘Anglo-American financial crisis’ Category

No, the Recession is Not Over

Ann Pettifor – 11th June 2009 – For the Guardian Online.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/12/recession-economic-crisis

A banker, Alan Clarke of BNP Paribas, citing a NIESR report, confidently tells the Guardian that the recession is over. Should we take the word of any banker – especially one that claims to be an economist – seriously?

Given that the economics profession was blind-sided by the ‘debtonation’ of 9th August, 2007, I am deeply sceptical. Second, given that this is a banker-induced recession; that reckless and often fraudulent behaviour by bankers led to a loss of $60 trillion of yours and my wealth (in the form of pensions, equities, lost interest on savings, and lost income from job losses) last year, should we believe a banker’s particular spin on the crisis?

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Iceland – a country of proud, indebted people

Ann Pettifor – 12th May 2009

Have just returned from a flying visit to Iceland, where I was mightily impressed by the warmth and strength of the Icelandic character. Also struck by the pride Icelanders have in the way the financial crisis deepened and strengthened their democracy – leading to the ousting of a corrupt government, and the election of a progressive coalition.

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Restoring Faith in Finance

Debtonation Readers: This is the full version of my latest blog for Huffington Post:15th March, 2009

Once a-ponzi time, millions worshiped at the feet of the Wizards of Finance.  These Wizards preached an economic religion that promised security and an abundance of riches from the ‘Emerald City’ — Wall St.

Investors following this religion were led to believe that they could make capital gains effortlessly and endlessly.

To make these gains, it was argued, there was no need for protection from the authorities. 401(k) plans were safe in the hands of the Wizards. There was also no need for investors to engage in hard work: to invest in research; to engage more labor; to sweat at making goods or delivering services.

There would be no need to save.  Money would be made effortlessly.

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Quantitative easing (QE) made easy

by Ann Pettifor, 8 March, 2009. There is much confusion about the meaning and impact of QE. This is an attempt to summarise what it means, what it does not mean, and how it can be effective in preventing insolvencies by lowering interest rates.

I am indebted to Graham Turner of GFC Economics for sharing his knowledge and experience of Japan’s use of QE with me. Graham spent time in Japan during the years of that country’s Credit Crunch which began in 1990, and is also knowledgeable about the 1930s when QE was adopted by policy-makers.  Japan adopted QE eleven years too late – in 2001, but has since then kept interest rates below 2%.

Graham notes that Ben Bernanke’s book “Essays on the Great Depression” ‘contains no reference to Quantitative Easing…there is astonishingly little analysis of the monetary policy response that secured recovery (in the 1930s) in any of Mr. Bernanke’s essays.’

First lets remind ourselves that a bond is like a loan. The issuer is the borrower, the bond holder is the lender.  So when I buy a bond from the Federal Reserve or BoE, the governors of these banks are issuing a bond (‘I promise to repay on this date…at this rate…’) and I am trusting their word with my money. Bonds, like loans, usually have a fixed term, or maturity. The interest rate on the bond is known as the ‘coupon’, and is what the issuer pays to the bond holders.

Rates on company or corporate bonds are important because they determine whether companies can afford to borrow to invest, to pay wages or to manage cash flow. They determine whether entrepreneurs can take risks – and invest, e.g. in green technology.  If they can’t do any of these things they declare bankruptcy, and lay off their employees.

Above all interest rates determine whether companies can afford to repay the huge debts dumped on them by lenders, so-called ‘private equity’ companies and other financial institutions during the inflation of the credit bubble.

Interest rates on government and corporate bonds can be lowered by QE – purchases of government bonds by central banks and the shifting of these bonds out of the market, and on to the balance sheets of central banks.

The first myth to dispel is that interest rates are currently low. Base rates may be low, but the rates that companies pay, as Warren Buffett has argued is at ‘record levels’.  He tells shareholders that “highly-rated companies, such as Berkshire, are experiencing borrowing costs that, in relation to Treasury rates, are at record levels.  Though Berkshire’s credit is pristine – one of only seven AAA corporations in the country – (its) cost of borrowing is now far higher than competitors with shaky balance sheets but government backing.”

Graham Turner shows that ‘average yields on loans for non-investment grade companies in the UK rose to 31.66% on the 4th March, 2009.’ These are bankrupting rates.

The second myth to dispel is that QE is about ‘printing money’. QE is not about directly using liquidity  injections to boost the supply of money. As we have learned to our cost, plenty of liquidity has been injected into banks, but this has not slowed the pace of bankruptcies. As Turner notes: ‘money supply (M) is entirely endogenous, and depends on the structure of borrowing costs being secured through bond purchases. ‘  It will be vital for the Bank of England to set a long term interest rate target, and to use the purchase of government gilts to reach that long-term, and low target.

QE is about preventing debtors from defaulting. This is done by the Central Banks targeting lower rates of interest e.g. for 30-year bonds (or loans), and achieving this by purchasing government bonds and taking them on to their balance sheets, (It can be used to purchase corporate bonds, but is more effective in bringing down all rates, if used to purchase government bonds.)

These purchases are known as ‘open market purchases’.  By purchasing government bonds,  central banks increase the price of the bonds, but damp down the yields, or rates of interest, on these bonds. It is particularly important that rates on e.g. 20-year bonds should be driven down low.

Within a month of the Federal Reserve starting large scale open market purchases of government bonds in April, 1932,  corporate bond yields had started to fall decisively.

By buying up government bonds, the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England will increase the price of government bonds, and lower the yield – effectively the interest rate on these bonds. By lowering the rate on government bonds, central banks will help suppress rates across the board.

By lowering rates, they will begin to help companies, and stop the spread of insolvencies – the economic ‘virus’ at the heart of the crisis.

Two additional points: QE has to be applied early on in the crisis. If insolvencies are allowed to spread and engulf the whole economy, there comes a point when QE just cannot help. Second, in a highly synchronised, global economy, it is vital that central banks co-ordinate and co-operate to apply QE across the board. If applied in just one or two economies, the measure will not work. If it is not applied in the United States soon, then US insolvencies will cause unemployment to spiral higher, and will exacerbate global economic failure.

So the stakes are high, and the timing of QE measures vital.



‘Muddling through’ – bishops, finance & the establishment

Ann Pettifor: 9th January, 2009, 17.00PM

Simon Jenkins writes for the UK Guardian,  and has a splenetic piece in the paper today. Its an attack on the economics profession which “has collapsed in ignominy and if there were any justice the profession would be sacked en masse”.  Could not agree more.  But he also has a pop at bishops. “The Church of England” he writes  “feels we had it coming to us, though it unfortunately omitted to warn us beforehand.”  That’s not true, nor is it fair.  The then Bishop of Worcester, Peter Selby wrote a powerful and insightful book in the early 1990s, titled “Grace and Mortgage” in which he both condemned the ‘hegemony of the finance system’ and warned it would end in crisis.  And he was not alone.

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A blind spot for Leviathan

4th December 2008

‘Financial writers’ and establishment economists seem to live in a different world.  They often bring to mind bats, hanging upside down in the cavernous, soaring rafters of a barn, analysing the world from a great distance, and upside-down. Take one Diana Henriques – described as a ’senior financial writer for the New York Times‘.  She was on the Rachel Maddow Show on US TV last night, reviewing the gargantuan $700 billion bail-out of US banks.  In defence of the opaque and unaccountable activities of the Treasury team dishing out taxpayer largesse she said this: “No-one could lay out a war-game for this (crisis) in advance”. (Ehem, correction: some were well prepared, and could have.)  But it was the next remark that took my breath away:

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What Europe wants from Obama

Speigel Online: 5th November 2008

My hope is that the next US president will help build a new, more just, stable and sustainable global financial architecture, vital for balance and stability in the world economy, but also for the eco-system…

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Beyond the triple crisis: a green new deal

Open Democracy: 27th October 2008

It is a small measure of the dramatic financial meltdown of 2007-08 that leading representatives of western liberal capitalism ransacked the past for reference-points to convey its scale…

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The next big shoe to fall…..

In my contribution to the Green New Deal in July, 2008 I warned that corporate debt defaults were the next “big shoe to fall”.  We are all aware of the devastating consequences of defaults by sub-prime borrowers. However their debts are miniscule compared to outstanding corporate debts. Now, I firmly predict,corporate debt defaults are about to cascade down on the global economy, leading to devastating impacts, not the least of which will be widespread unemployment. How can I be so sure?

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Keynes and taxpayers’ largesse

I wrote a piece on Keynes and monetary policy for the Standard, which appeared on Thursday, 23rd October, 2008. You can read it below. Today a group of monetarist economists , supported by a range of bankers, have written to the Telegraph objecting to a public works programme to help economic recovery. They are right that excessive liabilities on the government’s balance sheet could cause interest rates to rise, but government spending has a multiplier effect, and very quickly pays for itself. They seem unaware of this economic fact. There is some overlap between our views on monetary policy as an effective tool, but I disagree with their view that UK government spending has been excessive.

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