This week I appeared on Newsnight with Gillian Tett of the FT and Louise Cooper of BGC Partners. We discussed our graphs of 2011 (see mine below) and wider questions around the global financial crisis this year – and how ecnomists and policy makers need to respond.

Watch the show on iPlayer for the next 5 days here. Our discussion begins at 33 mins.

Below is my slideshow from the talk:

While I was in Australia I recorded this interview with ABC’s daily show. This went out on 15th September. Watch it above or on ABC’s website here >

Read about my speaking tour of Australia below – from the SEARCH Foundation:

The SEARCH Foundation is currently touring eminent British economist and author Ann
Pettifor around Australia and she is visiting our shores with a warning; the GFC inducing credit
crunch is not over and Australia’s banking sector is vulnerable.

Ms Pettifor is visiting Adelaide, Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra and Brisbane for speaking
engagements over the next fortnight.

“Before the Credit Crunch of 2008-2009 Brits and Americans were convinced that the good
times could last forever. Our orthodox economists, central bankers and politicians encouraged
us in that delusion. Today millions of the unemployed, homeless and bankrupt are paying
a heavy price for the failure to understand the role of the private banking system in causing
systemic and widespread economic failure.” Ms Pettifor said.

“Australians would be well advised not to fall into the same trap.

“At the same time, the increased frequency of extreme weather events is challenging the
widespread delusion that there is no limit to the rate at which humanity can go on polluting the
atmosphere and looting the seas and wider ecosystem.

“Australians, who have suffered more from extreme weather events than we have in Britain
would do well to take the lead in warning the world of a widespread delusion: that there are no
limits to the rate at which we can consume and ‘grow’.

“Instead we all need to address the most urgent crises facing humanity: the continuing global
financial crisis (it never did end in 2008); the threat of peak oil; the threat of climate change;
and now the rising threat of food and water shortages. That is why we, at the New Economics
Foundation first proposed the Green New Deal in July, 2008.

“We argued then, and we argue now, that societies must first fix the out-of-control globalised
financial system. We must strip the Masters of the Universe of their mighty power – after all
they rely on the world’s taxpayers to guarantee their profits and bonuses, and to socialise their
losses.

“Only then can we put the domestic banking system to work to help finance the transformation
of the economy away from costly globalised finance on the one hand and dependence on
fossil fuels on the other. Instead, tight but low cost-finance, generated by our domestic banking
systems must be put at the service of the transformation of the economy.

“We need massive investment in sustainable, renewable sources of energy and in the
conservation of the ecosystem’s resources.

“The banking system must provide regulated, low-cost finance for that investment. Just as
the banking system of the late 1930s and 40s helped finance economic recovery from the ’29

Crash; and then the challenge societies faced in 1939: World War.

“Such a transformation – a Green New Deal – will require greater self-sufficiency, and the
localisation of economies as far as practicable. It will also require the training and recruitment
of a ‘carbon army’ of workers – skilled and unskilled – to turn every building into a power
station, and to make every building energy-efficient.

“But just as central bankers and politicians turned a blind eye to the looming credit-crunch of
2008, so now they are turning a blind eye to the financial and ecological threats facing society.

“For example, right now, Australia’s mining boom is masking the vulnerability of her banking
system – and the threats that both high levels of household debt, and instability in globalised
capital markets pose to Australian banks – and therefore to the economy.

“Despite Mr. Glenn Stevens’ sanguine approach to the stability of Australia’s banks in his
recent testimony to the Australian parliament, insurance against the risk of Australian banks
defaulting – credit default swaps – climbed nearly 50% over August. That means that investor
expectations of Australian banks’ defaulting are on the rise. In addition, the cost of raising
40% of Australian bank funding ($100 billion) in global capital markets has been rising as a
result of instability in the Eurozone and US.

“The rising cost of this integration of the Australian banking system in the globalised economy
invariably means that Australian banks – and the financing of the current account deficit – are
more vulnerable to the whims of global investors.

“And as a result of the falling confidence in global capital markets, interest rates on loans
to Australian businesses and households will rise too – at a time when their customers are
snapping purses shut; house prices are sliding as Australians slowly pay down very high levels
of debt; and mortgage costs have been ratcheted up by the RBA’s raising of base rates to the
highest in the developed world;

“No amount of iron ore is going to fix Australia’s financial system. Australia needs a Green
New Deal.”

For media interviews with Ann Pettifor whilst she is in Australia, please call Peter
Murphy on 0418 312 301.
’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’
Note to editors.
1. Ann Pettifor a fellow of the New Economics Foundation (nef) in London, UK, and director
of PRIME economics, is visiting Australia on a two-week tour, sponsored by the Search
Foundation.

Ms Pettifor first predicted a credit crunch in September, 2003 on launching a book she edited
and Palgrave Macmillan published: “The Real World Economic Outlook.” Later in October,
2006, Palgrave Macmillan published her book: “The Coming First World Debt Crisis”. Then in
a Times interview in 2009, she warned that “the worst of the slump is yet to come.”
2. In his recent evidence Mr Stevens of the Reserve Bank of Australia said: “Major Australian
banks report being offered substantial US dollar funding offshore on account of their relatively
high credit standing. In any event, their reliance on such wholesale funding is much reduced
from three years ago, with the large increase in deposit funding at home and slower balance
sheet growth.” And yet in May this year, Moody’s downgraded all four of Australia’s major
banks, as ABC reported at the time.

Wall Street plummeted as concerns over European debt and the US economic downturn spurred a broad sell-off. Photograph: Shen Hong/Xinhua Press/Corbis

Read my article from Guardian Cif, Friday 19th August:

As bank shares and stock markets plummet, and investors flock to the safety of government bonds; as obstinate EU leaders crucify their countries in a futile struggle to defend today’s equivalent of the gold standard; as British and American politicians adopt austerity policies and drive their economies closer to the cliffs of depression; and as most professional economists stand aloof from the escalating crisis – what lies ahead for ordinary punters like you and me?

First, let’s take look at the big political picture. This crisis is already sharpening the divide between left and right in both the EU and the United States. Studying a precedent – the implosion of the 1920s credit bubble in 1929 – we note that four years after that crisis erupted, the political divide sharpened decisively. The United States and Britain moved to the left. Germany chose a different path. After 1930, Germany’s Centre party under Chancellor Brüning adopted austerity policies that resulted in cuts in welfare benefits and wages, while credit was tightened. At the same time the German government engaged in wildly excessive borrowing from the liberalised international capital markets. The ground was laid for the rise of fascism.

Four years after the “debtonation” of August 2007, our political classes in both the EU and the US have consciously declined to restrain out-of-control finance sectors or to fix broken, effectively insolvent banks. Instead, central bankers deployed taxpayer-backed resources (quantitative easing) to finance, guarantee and bail out bankers who then went on a wild, speculative spending spree.

At the same time, politicians imposed austerity on the more socially useful and productive sectors of the economy, both public and private. In both the EU and US these economic strategies have angered the populace and emboldened the right; in particular the far right. Looking ahead through the political lenses of austerity, street rioting and Tea Party obstructionism, the signs are ominous.

And then there is the impact on our own living standards. For comparisons and precedent, we need only look at Japan. Our politicians and central bankers have not learned from Japan’s crisis, which preceded our own. We are, therefore, destined to follow Japan’s disastrous record of lost decades of economic activity. As in Japan, so here: a broken banking system, crushed by the weight of unpayable debts on its balance sheet, fails to lend to businesses at affordable rates. Pretty soon this constrains investment. First-time buyers can’t get affordable loans or overdrafts, placing downward pressure on property prices.

A fall in investment is compounded by government policies for austerity – rises in VAT, and cuts in public spending. These policies trigger a rise in unemployment. Rising unemployment causes people to snap their purses shut, placing even further downward pressure on prices, profits, wages and employment. The downward spiral is then hard to arrest.

Property prices across Japan have continued to slide uninterrupted for nearly two decades. Hard though it may be for us to accept, it is not impossible to imagine UK property prices falling for the next two decades.

Just as here, Japan’s politicians and central bankers exaggerated the risks of inflation, reflecting the concerns of bankers and creditors – who fear inflation will erode the value of their outstanding loans. And so they were slow to a) use monetary policy to help the broader economy recover, and b) to restructure banks. The primary Keynesian tools for reversing the Great Depression were an aggressive monetary policy combined with extensive restructuring of the banking system.

While Keynes is largely defined (by his enemies) as a fiscal activist, he was first and foremost a monetary economist. In other words, he believed that if governments and central bankers would only fix the money system – by lowering rates of interest for all borrowers (not just the banks); by injecting QE into productive, socially useful projects; and by restructuring the banking system – the rest of the economy could be helped to recover.

Because our politicians and central bankers have so firmly rejected these lessons, prospects don’t look good for us at all. Instead, we would do well to echo Frank Zappa’s realism: “I mean to say that every day/Is just another rotten mess/And when it’s gonna change, my friend/Is anybody’s guess.”

Tonight, Wednesday 3 August 2011 at 08.00pm BST (GMT +1), BBC Radio 4 will broadcast a debate which took place at the London School of Economics (LSE) on 26 July.  This broadcast will be repeated on Saturday, 6 August, at 10.15 p.m BST (GMT +1).

Along with my colleagues Prof. Victoria Chick and Douglas Coe at PRIME  we have written the following response to the debate:

Debaters considered whether Keynes or Hayek had the solution to the present financial crisis. The economist George Selgin and philosopher Jamie Whyte spoke for Hayek; Keynes’s biographer Robert Skidelsky and the economist Duncan Weldon spoke for Keynes.

On the one hand we are pleased that the BBC and the LSE now acknowledge rival positions to the present austerity policies of Western governments. On the other  we are concerned that the debate might have served mainly to reinforce existing prejudices, rather than to clarify the substance of the matters under discussion, matters which – there can be no doubt – are of the most profound importance.

Lord Skidelsky provocatively but justly reminded the audience that in the early 1930s, the same orthodoxy driving western austerity policies directed the actions of Germany’s 1931 Bruning government and paved the way for the rise of Nazism. These actions – vigorously opposed by Keynes – were the final straw for a Germany crushed by defeat and the disastrous boom-bust cycle that followed their return to the gold standard. Reparations were easily circumvented by wildly excessive borrowing from financial interests around the world, in a manner that even Keynes did not anticipate. It was these financial and fiscal policies that brought Hitler to power.

With financial interests still firmly in the ascendency and reactionary right-wing forces increasing their grip in the United States and much of the Western world, we must not forget these lessons from history, which formed the background to the original debate between Keynes and Hayek themselves. The stakes are high indeed.

Keynes shared with Hayek a preference for the economy to be primarily the province of the private sector. However, he recognised that ‘the market’ did not always best serve the common good and therefore that state intervention was necessary – and not just during a slump. In this he was diametrically opposed to Hayek.

For Keynes, the market’s major flaws were rooted in monetary arrangements that favoured speculation and excess consumption rather than productive activity. In addition, in a slump, the pessimistic outlook of producers and investors allowed the slump to persist and needed the stimulus of public works expenditure.

The LSE debate neglected the subtleties of the respective positions of Hayek and Keynes and reinforced many of the most common and most dangerous fallacies about Keynes’s contribution – and even established some new ones.  While both economists were misrepresented to some extent, our main concern must be to rectify distortions about Keynes. There are eight misrepresentations that we want to bring out.

1.   Hayek as “an opponent of financial excess”

From 1971 through the early 1980s, restraints on the financial sector were steadily unwound. These actions were prompted by Hayekian ideals of liberalism, as is well known.  The Hayek supporters at the LSE debate dissociated themselves from this liberalisation, the cause as we now know, of the rapid expansion of the money supply before the crash. Hayek might not have predicted this consequence of liberalisation, but its disastrous consequences are now plain to one and all. Perhaps this is why the debaters dissociated themselves from this aspect of Hayek’s position. Instead they castigated the conduct of the liberalisation policy rather than the policy itself. Indeed the ideal of liberalisation was scarcely mentioned, for to do so would be to acknowledge the existence of an alternative: Keynes’s managed financial system.

2.   Keynesian policy as “promoting the big state”

Keynes’s most substantial legacy was a financial system managed by the state.  This system prevailed from the end of the gold standard until the 1970s. This management ensured that on the one hand low long-term interest rates facilitated both private and public sector investment; on the other, restraints on

banks and capital mobility kept speculation and excessive consumption at bay. Keynes had devised and helped implement a financial system that was conducive to production and investment rather than speculation and consumption.  A larger state rightly prevailed than in the 1920s or 1930s, but ironically Keynes’s state was still smaller than the state that prevailed after the counter-revolution of financial liberalisation

The post-war world was one in which the state and the private sector operated powerfully in tandem, supported by a greatly revised monetary architecture.

As we have stressed, Keynes was concerned mainly with the effective operation of the private economy.

3.   The inflation of the 1970s as “the fault of Keynesian policies”

The inflation of the 1970s began just after the Keynesian post-war mechanisms for the regulation of finance started to be dismantled. In Britain, controls on banking and capital mobility were relaxed, and liberalised arrangements were restored, beginning with Competition and Credit Control (1971) (evaluated as “all competition, no control” by most economists). The root cause of the inflation of the 1970s was the massive expansion of the money supply that followed the deregulation of credit control, as both Friedman’s monetarism and Keynes’sGeneral Theory, Ch. 21, predict.

The inflation of the 1970s was not the consequence of Keynes’s policies but of the dismantling of his policies for restraining the finance sector. In the past, the inflationary 1970s would have been understood as a ‘bankers’ ramp’.

4.   Keynes as “advocate of deficit spending”

While the importance of Keynes’s monetary policies is scarcely recognised, even his fiscal policies are severely misrepresented. Most prominent and pernicious of all is the idea that he advocated deficit spending. From his earliest contributions to the debate on fiscal policy, Keynes was concerned to establish how public works expenditure would pay for itself and would constitute a relief rather than a burden to the public finances. As we have shown in ‘The economic consequences of Mr Osborne’,[i] the outcomes of public expenditure policies over the last century vindicate his analysis. It remains a puzzle why even Keynes’s most ardent champions neglect the evidence.

5.   Keynes as “a supporter of wasteful expenditures”

(Photo: REUTERS / Yiorgos Karahalis )
A Greek riot policeman stands in front of graffiti written on the wall of a bank during violent demonstrations over austerity measures in Athens, May 5, 2010. Greece faced a day of violent protests and a nationwide strike by civil servants outraged by the announcement of draconian austeristy measures.

Dear readers….Recovering from ‘flu and a trip down to Hay on Wye…Thought you might be interested in this piece I have written for Prime.

“We should note recent developments in political economy, that – while understated – are, we hope, of significance. Last week, the OECD published their latest World Economic Outlook, which features chapters on each developed economy as well as an assessment of the world economy as a whole.

The report is schizophrenic. It clumsily offers an outlook of excessive optimism; makes a selective assessment of ‘risks’; but continues adherence to an economic policy doctrine that is clearly making OECD economists very uncomfortable.

While the OECD report contains the expected justifications and support for the ‘austerity’ approach, nevertheless the organisation’s ‘cold feet’ are becoming apparent, even before the full extent of austerity programmes has begun to impact. There is no better example of this unease than their approach to the UK.

The report commends UK policymakers for their “current fiscal consolidation (which) strikes the right balance and should continue.”  At the same time, OECD economists hedge their bets by urging the UK government to embark on “higher infrastructure spending (that) would lower the short-term negative growth effects of consolidation without affecting its pace.”   At a press conference last week, the OECD chief economist warned that the UK should be prepared to cool austerity in the wake of weaker growth.

In parallel, President Obama was reported as disappointing the expectations of UK policymakers by failing to endorse the Government’s approach to economic policy. While Obama has not proved the champion of the better world that we had all hoped, – he is no FDR -  his stance is important and perhaps even brave.

In the second half of 2010 the world economy began to weaken, but this is greatly underplayed by OECD economists.  Instead they point to a perceived optimistic outlook ahead. But this outlook is thinly based. We are told that financial conditions are improving: but in the UK the latest assessments of project Merlin flatly contradict such a notion.

Source: www.telegraph.co.uk. Data: BBa / BIS / Bank of England

In the real economy, world trade has retreated substantially from the relatively rapid outturns at the start of 2010. The report recognises that this is a consequence of monetary policy tightening in emerging markets and the wearing off of stimulus packages in major economies. The retraction of earlier stimulus programmes by the US and EU is rather an understatement. Stimulus has not only been withdrawn, it has been replaced by austerity.

So what are the grounds for OECD optimism?   Especially given that their economists remain obsessed by inflation as the causa causans of all possible outcomes. Their overriding fear is that inflation will cause consumers to retrench. This threat is then used to justify tighter monetary policies – which would hurt over-indebted consumers, corporates and SMEs. But unemployment is a much more important driver of consumer behaviour. Wage earners snap their purses shut in the wake of what for many millions is the reality of, and for others the threat of, unemployment. Inflation is no doubt painful to the less well-off, but from a macroeconomic perspective ‘core inflation’ today is at low levels, no matter how much the OECD tries to play it up. Watch out as inflation falls rapidly over the next few months, in line with weakening economies.

The austerity and fierce monetary strategies embarked on by governments – already burdened by losses transmitted by the private banking crisis – have been directed by the civil servants of supra-national organisations: such as the OECD and IMF as well as the global central banking fraternity. These public employees enjoy immense influence, and as the the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet indicated in a speech on 2 June, 2011 they wish to capture:

“a much deeper and authoritative say in the formation of the country’s economic policies….. A direct influence, well over and above the reinforced surveillance that is presently envisaged”

Given the ECB’s role in exacerbating the crisis in Greece (described by Nouriel Roubini as ‘throwing good money after bad – to bail out, rather than bailing in, reckless creditors….a giant Ponzi scheme”)  such “authoritative” advice  by supra-national organisations has crucified economies “in a struggle which is certain to prove futile” –  to quote Keynes.

But the OECD’s latest report hints that minds might be changing. It contains the beginnings of the admission that the world is being forced down a desperate path that has no justification in economic reason and the evidence of history. The experience of the great depression stands before us. It was only enlightened monetary policies and expansionary fiscal policy that restored the US and UK not only to health but to a position to resist reactionary forces and fascism.  The current strategy is likely to make us more vulnerable to reactionary political forces – in the EU and the US.

Some might like to celebrate the previous timid stimulus for e.g. car scrappage schemes etc, under both Alastair Darling and the Larry Summers White House.  But in the light of present events, it is clear that their approach was designed not to save society but to preserve a financial system that has palpably failed the vast majority of the citizens of the world.

We at PRIME economics have repeatedly called for something greater and more just. Perhaps the foot-shuffling of the OECD indicates recognition that imposing austerity policies at a time of global economic weakness is indeed a futile struggle – soon to be abandoned?”

Much of the news of the last few weeks -

• the financialised commodities mania;
• the disgraceful abuse by the banks of payment protection insurance;
• the mortgage fraud which led US banks to rush through foreclosures without proper process and evict people from their homes;and their  decision reported  in the WSJ to offer a miserly $5 billion to settle claims by federal and state officials of these  fraudulent mortgage-servicing practices;
• HSBC’s quarterly fall in profits,
• HSBC’s threat announced today to cut thousands of jobs

As I wrote in a blog for the Huffington Post in October last year – banking  has been turned on its head, and the system, bizarrely, has become a borrowing, not a lending machine. No-one, not politicians, not regulators, not central bankers, least of all bankers themselves – appears prepared, or has the political will and the guts –  to fix it.

Above all, the damage will not be fixed until governments implement policies that stimulate economic activity, so that companies can hire workers, and generate income for both themselves and their employees. This in turn,will generate income for banks.

As world leaders meet in Pittsburgh and then Istanbul (for the World Bank and IMF meetings) expect much self-congratulation and back-slapping for having got the world through the post-Lehman crisis.

But behind the cacophony of self-praise, watch out for three alarms flashing red:

• The escalating foreclosure and rising mortgage delinquency rates in the US
• The dramatic contraction of credit in the US over the summer – putting paid to any hope of the US acting as the ‘engine’ of a global recovery
• That big accident waiting to happen to the European economies –Spain

With the help of a great new book – about to be published in the US – let’s take a look at why there is no room for complacency.

“No way to run an economy” (Pluto Press, 2009) is by a man whose research and analyses I have come to respect and rely upon – Graham Turner of GFC economics. While the book is full of solid facts and data – it is eminently readable for those prepared to unleash their inner wonk.

Turner lived and worked in Japan through the last twenty years of debt-deflation – and now looks at the US and European economies through the prism of that prolonged deflationary crisis. And it’s not a pretty sight.

He first takes a close look at the Bernanke/Geithner/Summers strategy for reflating the US economy. There are, or at least were, five planks to this strategy – lower interest rates, the Public Private Investment Program (remember that?); mortgage modification; fiscal expansion and ‘stress tests’.

While free money and fiscal expansion, Turner argues, may have helped the Dow move up – it’s not reflating the economy. On the contrary, debt-driven deflation is the order of the day – reflected in debt defaults, falling house prices, rising foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies. But stabilising the housing market is key to bank solvency, to generating employment and to kick-starting a full recovery.

All the signs are that despite their massive collective brain power the Bernanke/Geithner/ Summers strategy will not give President Obama and the Democratic Party the sound economic recovery needed to win over the electorate in 2010.

So self-congratulation should be put on hold for a while…..

What of the Europeans? They will be at Pittsburgh to boast of imminent recovery, and to contrast their economies with Anglo-American economies. They will imply that in Euroland policy-makers were more cautious about lending, and that their economies are therefore less prone to Anglo-American-style bubbles.

That might be plausible – if it were not for Spain, Ireland, Eastern Europe and the European Central Bank (ECB).

For if the Federal Reserve has blundered – and it has – the governor of the ECB is guilty of criminal inaction and continued complacency. Indeed at the height of the crisis – in July, 2008 – the ECB actually raised interest rates! Consider one of the most disastrous impacts of that massive strategic miscalculation: the growing debt-deflationary crises in Spain, Ireland and Eastern Europe.

Of these the crisis in Spain is the most alarming. Just as in the US, real interest rates are still high – despite recent, belated cuts by the ECB – and remain well above falling and negative prices and wages. According to Variant Perception the Spanish real estate crash is worse than widely believed; banks are hiding their losses, and while Forbes magazine might argue that “Spanish banks are in Top Form” – that may be because Forbes has not looked closely at their balance sheets. Spanish banks are hiding their losses, it is alleged – by sophisticated accounting tricks, by not marking loans to market (i.e. valuing them higher than the market would) and by lending to what Variant call ‘zombie companies’ – mostly in the construction sector.

Sound familiar? Could this be happening in other parts of the global financial forest?

Spain, like the US is experiencing deflation. Prices have been falling for three months in a row. At the same time – and just as in the US – unemployment is still rising – heading towards a socially and politically disruptive 25% .

It’s worse in much of the rest of the European periphery. Prices in Ireland are falling at an annual rate of 5.9% – the highest deflation rate in the world.

The big losers will not just be the poor and middle classes of these countries: deflation will have ‘broad ramifications across the European banking sector’.

Why? Because countries on the periphery are net debtors, and the rest of Europe – including France and Germany – are net creditors. When the debtors stop paying their creditors – then Germany, France and other members of the European Union will face huge losses. On top of that they will need to re-capitalise Spain and the periphery economies – costly to their taxpayers.

When that crisis comes, Mrs Merkel may well have survived a German election campaign. But other G-20 leaders will not be so lucky.

Their management of the global economy and their legitimacy will have been severely tested – this time by voters.

Motley Fool blogger TMF Sinchiruna spotlights the Times interview, describing me as “once ridiculed, later vindicated…” TMF Sinchiruna goes on to say: “Peter Schiff, Jim Rogers, Niall Fergusson, Ann Pettifor … these are the voices that I believe investors need to hear. Turn off the tv and look deep into the events of last year and consider for yourselves whether anything more than a hail-mary reflationary maelstrom has been heaped upon the fire that started it all.”

Read the Motley Fool article >

Also just did an interview for You and Yours on Radio 4 which was broadcast Wednesday. You can listen to it here.