This week I appeared on Newsnight with Gillian Tett of the FT and Louise Cooper of BGC Partners. We discussed our graphs of 2011 (see mine below) and wider questions around the global financial crisis this year – and how ecnomists and policy makers need to respond.

Watch the show on iPlayer for the next 5 days here. Our discussion begins at 33 mins.

Image: acknowledgements to the BBC.

The Autumn Statement reveals but one thing: the Chancellor and his advisers are both ill-advised and dangerously ill-prepared for the forthcoming prolonged Depression. (And if you think I exaggerate, let me remind you that 20 years after the Japanese debt bubble burst, Tokyo house prices are still falling, and the stock market is worth 60% less than 20 years ago. And the Japanese economy was in a healthier state then, than the UK is today, thanks to an export surplus.)

Today’s penalising of the innocent – public sector workers, pensioners and those hundreds of thousands of young people entering the labour market  - is a result of a deeply flawed economic analysis by the Chancellor of the causes of the global financial crisis.

No depression will be averted;  no government borrowing will be reduced; no economic recovery can be hoped for, until the cause of the crisis is correctly analysed and then addressed with appropriate policies.

For me an interesting angle on the day was the difference in emphasis between the official Treasury Autumn Statement, and the Chancellor’s speech. The latter was far more ideological of course; but the Treasury Statement does indicate some grasp of the scale of the crisis. The very first paragraph of the full Statement (on page 11) reads:

“The UK economy is recovering from the biggest financial crisis in generations. Prior to the crisis, underlying competitiveness fell and economic growth was driven by unsustainable levels of debt, with the UK seeing the greatest expansion in debt of all the world’s major economies over the last decade. As a result, the UK experienced the deepest recession of any major economy except Japan and the Government inherited a budget deficit forecast to be the largest in the G20.” (My emphasis.)

So the Treasury does get it. The country that enthusiastically hosts the biggest global banks in the world; that celebrates “London ..as the world’s pre-eminent financial centre” (to quote the Chancellor today) witnessed “the greatest expansion in debt of all the world’s major economies over the last decade” – and as a consequence, the public finances worsened.

From these simple facts much analysis flows.

The most important is this: Britain (and the Eurozone) are not facing a sovereign debt crisis. We are not facing a crisis of the public finances. Instead: we are facing the biggest ever crisis of the private financial system.

Why? Because the “greatest expansion in debt of all the world’s economies” is not going to be paid back.

“The greatest expansion of debt in all the world’s economies” must first be written off, ‘de-leveraged’ or paid down.

As this process grinds relentlessly forward, the banks that lent “the greatest expansion of debt in all the world’s economies” face bankruptcy – if not now, in the near future.

That is the crisis we all face. The bankruptcy of the global private banking system - based in our backyard.

The mobilising of finance for the Eurozone is to bail out private banks that engaged “in the greatest expansion of debt.”  Although you would not believe this from media reporting, its purpose is not to bail out sovereign governments. The stubborn refusal of German politicians (with whom I have some sympathy) to agree to further taxpayer-backed bailouts of the private finance sector means that private banks face imminent bankruptcy.

Which is the why the Polish Foreign Minister warns of an impending “crisis of apocalyptic proportions“.

Given this terrifying prospect, what do our Treasury mandarins and British Chancellor recommend?

First, that we make it easier for employers to sack people, and thereby increase unemployment and cut wages – making it harder for those employees to pay back debts.

Second that we cut public sector wages of those in employment – with which some of those private debts may have been paid back. Third, that we penalise future pensioners. For why? And fourth, that we try and rescue 200,000, but sacrifice hundreds of thousands more young people on the dustheap of unemployment. That policy alone will cut the nation’s income; income that could help the banks put balance sheets back in the black.

The Chancellor’s speech reminded me of the parent that knows his child is hiding behind the curtain, but instead looks under the sofa, inside the box, behind the dresser – everywhere except where the solution lies. A silly, but in his case, dangerous game.

The fact is that the solution does not lie with cuts in public spending; with austerity. We have had only eighteen months of synchronised austerity across Europe and already the British and world economy teeters on the brink.

The failure is not that austerity was not implemented; the failure is austerity.

Private money markets are not asking for deeper austerity. They are asking for a revival of economic activity. They are begging for governments to draw back from the policies that have caused output, investment and employment to fall off a cliff.

But that is hard for governments such as ours, gripped as they are by an antiquated and flawed economic orthodoxy. As David Graeber  explains so well in his book “Debt: the first five thousand years.” orthodox economists – believe it or not – do not understand the nature of money and credit. An unfortunate weakness for a profession majoring on the economy.

Nor can their jaundiced Scrooge-like minds accept that prosperity is caused by employment. Not by rich, ‘light-touch’ regulated bankers.

They find it hard to grasp that money/credit – that is not generated by savings, but begins life at the Bank of England – can provide a bridge to employment. But only if it is managed carefully, and not outsourced to the reckless greed, and fraudulent behaviour of bankers and their friends in government. (See today’s story about Hank Paulson’s “inside jobs” with Wall St.)

Orthodox economists like those in the Treasury and the Conservative party cannot grasp one simple but vital truth. Employment can generate the income needed to a) repay debt b) pay tax revenues to lower the budget deficit and c) restore both general prosperity and a sense of national well-being. All of which might be of some help to the private finance sector.

Instead our policy and decision-makers are playing petulant, disgracefully irresponsible games with all our futures. And missing the biggest crisis of all: the imminent bankruptcy of the private finance sector.

Published in the Guardian Cif alongside responses from Jonathon Freedland and Sheila Lawlor:

Ed Balls said sorry for Labour’s record on ultra-light-touch financial regulation, and that must be acknowledged.

But apologies are just not enough. He and Ed Miliband must stop attacking his electoral base, “hardworking families”, many of whom are trades unionists.

As Balls recognises, unless urgent action is taken, this may be the gravest economic crisis in history – given the global integration of finance and the growth of world population.

So Balls must go further.

First, he must declare loudly and forcefully that Labour will never again be captive to neoliberal central bankers like Alan Greenspan; or private bankers like Sir Fred Goodwin of RSB.

Labour must never again be seen to be in the pockets of the finance sector.

Balls and Miliband must give the Labour party back to its electoral base, to its members.

They must both distance themselves from Labour leaders that profit from links to the global finance sector.

Second, Balls must stop talking about the deficit; about “tough decisions on tax and spending” – the last thing the economy needs. It is private debt – 469% of British GDP and six times the public debt – that is the real crisis facing Britons. It is debt-deflation, and debt-deleveraging, and collapsing private investment that pose the gravest threat to us all.

Given this, there is an urgent need for government spending on environmentally sound projects to generate economic activity – jobs, the income, the savings that will help protect us from Armageddon.

Until he does, his apologies will count for nothing but special pleading.

Read the original article on Cif here >

While I was in Australia I recorded this interview with ABC’s daily show. This went out on 15th September. Watch it above or on ABC’s website here >

It was wonderful to be, first of all at such a professionally and well organised event (congrats to Mark Letcher and his team). It was also fantastic to be amongst such an interesting array of speakers including John Gapper ‘the secret gardener’ who has spent the last 35 years propagating wild flowers in Brighton and Hove (watch his talk here) and Alice Ferguson and Amy Rose – two mothers with a simple but brilliant idea to get children playing outside (watch their talk here).

My talk was on how we can afford to finance the Green Transition – watch below:

Have just been told that my post on the Left Foot Forward on Ed Balls’s speech  crashed the site “under weight of people wanting to read it”…so here it is for those of you that may have missed it….

David Cameron was delighted when the formidable Ed Balls walked straight into his framing of the debate on the deficit – and was promptly trapped.

That framing goes as follows. We (the government) have spent beyond our means. And the way to pay for it, is by cutting (public sector) jobs, and raising taxation - like VAT.

Ed Balls’s speech concedes (as Labour has done since Alastair Darling’s time at the Treasury) the deficit-reduction-emphasis agenda set by his opponents. And by so doing – implicitly concedes the need to cut public sector jobs.

But I am being unfair.  Balls began his speech by mentioning Labour’s “emphasis on jobs and growth” But the speech immediately morphed into Labour’s concession to the Coalition: that what is needed is “a steady and balanced approach to halve the deficit in four years”. The implication being that cuts must be matched by ‘jobs and growth’.

But the highlight of the speech – the sound-byte that his spin doctors no doubt intended the media to emphasize-  is a call for a cut in VAT “to boost consumer confidence and jump-start the economy.”

Cameron flashed back his retort: ”slashing taxes” he argued, would only make the UK’s fiscal deficit worse.

And so Balls is trapped.

The debate now centres on whether the deficit can be financed by increasing or cutting taxes, in particular VAT. For most people, Cameron has the upper hand.  ’Of course the deficit can only be financed by increased taxes’ is the consensus. Because we have ‘spent beyond our means’ – we have to raise taxes, like VAT.   “Slashing” VAT – when it’s higher VAT returns that are paying down the deficit – is unacceptable to the Coalition, to the Treasury, to orthodox economists and to the bulk of the British public.

But that’s only because most have been drilled in the propaganda: “the deficit is like a credit card”. We need to pay it down. To do so, we have to mobilise/hoard ‘savings’ – i.e. higher taxes – to pay down the ‘credit card’.

But the government’s deficit is not like a credit card. And nor do we need ‘savings’ to pay it down.

The only surefire way of paying down the deficit is not by government cutting the deficit – which I and others have argued it cannot do -  but by employment.

Put 2.43 million people back to work, and hey presto! the deficit will vanish.

Get 2.43 million people – including thousands of skilled and unskilled workers, clever and talented student graduates –  to address Britain’s very real insecurities in energy, food and health – and hey presto, the deficit will be financed.

How? By the tax revenues that will pour into the Treasury’s coffers, either directly or indirectly – and by the savings that will be made on welfare benefits.

However, keep 2.43 million people unemployed, keep them feeling insecure, with their purses firmly shut, and you can guarantee an ever-rising government deficit (April’s deficit numbers were the highest on record for that month).

And 2.43 million unemployed is sure to make British ‘confidence’ fall and the recession deepen.

Ed Balls has to face this fact: cutting VAT on falling retail sales will do little to ‘restore confidence’. Confidence is evaporating, and retail sales are falling, not just because of VAT – but because of the fear of unemployment.

The only thing that will restore confidence will be: employment. And while it is encouraging that the private sector created 88,000 jobs between February and April, that still leaves 2.43 million people economically inactive, unemployed and lacking in confidence. Many millions more are worried about their job security, rising fuel and food prices.

So Ed Balls’ speech should have gone like this.

Jobs will cut the deficit.

Look after unemployment – and the budget will take care of itself.

And if the private sector can only create 88,000 jobs in 3 months - while 2.43 million people remain economically inactive, depriving the Treasury of tax revenues, costing the Treasury dear in welfare benefits – and causing the deficit to rise even higher – then government must step in and spend on public works, to create jobs.

Jobs will cut the deficit – and simultaneously create the ‘confidence’ the private sector needs to invest – to create more jobs.

That framing would have put David Cameron on the defensive – would have pleased Labour’s base, and would have encouraged insecure voters. It would have put Ed Balls and Ed Miliband in a ‘winning state of mind’.

Instead we are back on sterile, old territory: the centrality of the deficit to all of political debate, and economic policy-making, and the eclipse of the subject of unemployment.  Paying down the deficit as Labour’s leadership and its right-wing constantly concedes, is REALLY IMPORTANT. For the Coalition it is is far more important than creating jobs, and getting 2.43 million people back into meaningful work.

So let’s go on emphasizing the deficit, and ignoring the unemployed. But please, spare us the tears and anguish of politicians and economists when the deficit keeps rising!

It goes without saying, I hope, that of course I support ‘clamping down on tax avoidance and evasion’ – but do not support ‘raising taxes’. I had asked the originators of the letter if we could debate this point, and later the words “those best able to pay” was added, without informing me. Even then, I may not have signed it. The fact is that with the UK’s rate of unemployment; with businesses facing a very hard time because of the rise in VAT and the cuts in government spending, and with banks effectively refusing to lend to SMEs and others (except at very high rates of interest)….this would not be the moment to raise taxes.

But I want to make a bigger point. By calling for taxes to be raised, the letter implicitly suggests that the deficit can be financed through increased taxation. In this sense, it echoes the orthodox line: that government expenditure is like a personal or corporate budget and that ‘savings’ (i.e.cuts or increased taxes on e.g. VAT) have to be found to finance it. That ‘we cannot afford to spend’. That the ‘money has run out’ and we need to find more – from somewhere, preferably taxation.

I strongly disagree. First, to reiterate: the government’s budget is not at all like individual, household or corporate budgets. Individuals cannot engage in ‘quantitative easing’. The Bank of England, on behalf of government, can, and indeed has done so, in order to support the financing of the UK government’s deficit. Individuals and corporates do not necessarily generate income from spending. The government can generate income from investment in public works. It’s a form of income called tax revenues. Third, individuals and corporates can go bankrupt. The government cannot – not even Zimbabwe.

Given these facts, the best way to finance the govermemt’s budget is by increasing, not cutting, the government’s  income – from increased economic activity. In this sense we can make a comparison between governments and individuals: as Prof Chick and I note in our latest update of “The economic consequences of Mr O” -

“Just as work makes things affordable for an individual, so too for society. A nation’s prosperity follows from its employment, not the other way around.”

What the VAT rise and cuts in government spending  do, is to cut economic activity – and therefore employment – and with it income from economic activity for the government.

And this, I fear,  is what raising taxes would do too. And I do not want to be party to that.

Tin produced at a Glencore plant in Vinto, Bolivia

“Experience shows that when policies falter in managing capital flows, there is no limit to the damage that international finance can inflict on an economy.”

Yilmaz Akyüz, “Capital Flows to Developing Countries in a Historical Perspective: Will the current Boom End with a Bust?”

Today, as speculation and leverage in global, financialised commodity markets reach manic levels; as we witness an ‘epic rout’ (FT 5 May, 2011) in commodity prices, and as the boom in capital flows peaks, is another crash inevitable? And is it coming soon?

I know from experience that while it may be possible to analyse fundamentals, it is always difficult to predict precisely what dynamic will trigger the next crisis, and when it will happen. Back in 2003, together with colleagues at the new economics foundation in London, and with very little funding, I assembled and edited a series of essays on the ‘outlook’ for the global economy. We titled it: ‘Real world economic outlook’, and added a subtitle, ‘the legacy of globalization: debt and deflation’. We intended the report to be annual, and to act as a counter to the IMF’s annual World Economic Outlook, which in our view was irrationally optimistic about developments in the global economy.

We were pretty pessimistic about global imbalances, and predicted a crash. Sadly, our timing was way out: the crash was four years away. It does not always help to be right on the fundamentals. Given the inevitability of the then forthcoming crash, we argued that there was once more a need for a ‘great transformation’ of the global economy. The starting point we wrote ‘will be to reverse the most pernicious elements of the ‘globalization’ experiment’ by the ‘taming of financial markets through the re-introduction of capital controls; restraints in the growth of credit; the establishment of an International Clearing Agency; and a Tobin Tax’.

Back then it was hard to talk/write about these matters – and be heard. Our cheerfully-titled report and predictions did not hit the best-seller lists. Funding for the project was withdrawn, and the project wound down. It’s major flaw? We had breached areas of economic debate that at the time were carefully circumscribed. It took the financial crisis of 2007-9 to loosen the intellectual chains to which orthodox economics had so heavily tied economic debate.   Today the Tobin Tax, or Robin Hood Tax is a high-profile issue, with some signs that EU governments are considering implementation of such a tax. (See point 8 of Euro leaders’ statement, March 11, 2011). So that taboo has been broken.

Another taboo subject then – control over capital flows (now re-designated as ‘capital flows management’ by the IMF) is now, in contrast to 2003, actively discussed, even though debate is limited to controls on inward flows. Debate on controls over outward flows – illicit capital flight that makes it so easy for corporations and elites to export their gains– are still taboo.

The big change came in February, 2010, when to the surprise of many, IMF staff accepted that ‘capital controls are part of the policy mix’. And by April, 2011, the Fund had developed a ‘framework’ to help countries manage capital flows.

This framework was promptly rejected by the G24, led by India and Brazil, for several reasons. First because the IMF was dealing with symptoms, not causes – i.e. the easy money policies of the Federal Reserve.  Quantitative easing (QE) was and is, intended to pump liquidity into the US economy; to allow funds to cascade down through the banking system, for lending to companies that would, in turn, invest in infrastructure and the creation of jobs.  Because, as Prof. Chick has noted, there is neither economic debate about the money supply, nor overt management of the money supply, there is no control over how banks deploy low-interest rate funds generated by the Fed.  US and US-based foreign banks are free to ignore the Fed’s mandate or the US administration’s priorities. Like the public utilities they effectively are, banks instead are free to draw down from the Fed’s easy and cheap money-creation – QE – to speculate, and accrue private gains in mainly developing and emerging markets (DEEs).  The IMF shows little interest in the implications for the global money supply of credit-creation by central banks and, in the view of many, turns a blind eye to these de-stabilising activities. Instead fund staff lecture poor countries on the management of capital inflows.  The G24 will have none of this, and instead demands that a light be shone on the causes of the boom in speculative capital flows.

Second, as Lesetja Kganyago, chairman of the G-24 and director-general of South Africa’s National Treasury told the Wall St Journal: the group opposed the IMF framework because the fund proposed to integrate it into its surveillance program and policy recommendations. G24 leaders – especially those leading some of the world’s biggest democracies – rightly expect to enjoy the same policy autonomy privileges usually reserved for leaders of the G8.

All of this makes a recent paper on the current boom in capital flows by Yilmaz Akyüz of the South Centre so timely, comprehensive and insightful. Akyüz is chief economist at the South Centre, Geneva and former director of the Division on Globalization and Development Strategies at UNCTAD, where he edited a range of UNCTAD’s annual reports.

Akyüz begins by noting that there have been three generalised boom-bust cycles in private capital flows since the end of the Second World War: all with devastating impacts on developing and emerging markets. The first started in the late 1970s, and ended with the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s. The second started in the early 1990s and was followed by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/8; and by defaults in Latin America and Russia. ‘The third cycle’ argues Akyüz ‘started in the early years of the new millennium and ended in the second half of 2008 with the subprime crisis. This was soon followed by a new boom, the fourth in the post-war era, which started in the first half of 2009 and is continuing with full force as of early 2011.’

Akyüz argues that this current cycle will most likely end with a reversal in the upswing in commodity prices, because commodity “markets have become more like financial markets…with several commodities treated as a distinct asset class, attracting growing amounts of money in search for profits from price movements…”

The commodity bubble began with a new financial instrument invented by Goldman Sachs – the Goldman Sachs’ Commodity Index (GSCI) – so argues Frederick Kaufman in the April, 2011 edition of Foreign Policy. Next, commodity price inflation received a boost in 1999, when the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission deregulated futures markets. “All of a sudden, bankers could take as large a position in grains as they liked, an opportunity that had, since the Great Depression, only been available to those who actually had something to do with the production of our food” writes Kaufman.   “Since the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000, there has been a 50-fold increase in dollars invested in commodity index funds.  In the first 55 days of 2008, speculators poured $55 billion into commodity markets, and by July, $318 billion was roiling the markets.”

As has been well documented, rising commodity markets have enriched the few, but impoverished millions of people. Driven in part by higher fuel costs, global food prices are 36 percent above their levels a year ago and remain volatile, the World Bank argued in a recent report: “A further 10 percent increase in global prices could drive an additional 10 million people below the $1.25 extreme poverty line. A 30 percent price hike could lead to 34 million more poor. This is in addition to the 44 million people who have been driven into poverty since last June as a result of the spikes. The World Bank estimates there are about 1.2 billion people living below the poverty line of US$1.25 a day.”

Falling commodity prices, therefore, are central to any strategy for reducing global poverty.

Have they begun to fall? As I write this (6 May, 2011) global commodity markets have been subject to what the FT calls an ‘epic rout’ “…the worst sell-off for many commodities since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, in dollar terms, the biggest-ever for Brent crude.”

While these markets may well stabilise, and be talked up (and down) again, it daily becomes clear to even the most orthodox economists that, in the real world, the global economic ‘recovery’ is very weak indeed. As that reality dawns on speculators (and long before it dawns on policy-makers) will there follow a collapse in index-traded commodity prices?

Furthermore, margin debt — the amount that speculators borrow for speculative purposes — is rising quickly, just as it did in advance of the 1929 stock market crash, the Nasdaq bubble and the subprime crash of 2006/7. Indeed, as the blogger, Cullen Roche of ‘Pragmatic Economist’ notes, margin debt is now at ‘manic levels’.   Debit balances at margin accounts skyrocketed to $20.7 billion in February.  ‘Only two other times historically have we seen leverage rise so much so fast and both times it was during a manic phase – during the tech bubble of the late 1990s and the credit bubble just a short four years ago.’

These debit balances, as an anonymous player at an investment boutique notes:

‘increase speculative volatility in things like oil, which goes from $40 to $150 to $50 to $130 over and over. Paper profits change accounts but the real economy is not theoretically affected, except that it is held hostage to this casino game of rapidly changing prices for basic materials and necessities that businesses and consumers use to make decisions. So the economy is in actuality disrupted by the casino, the casino creates no net wealth, and everyone is worse off as this charade continues.’

We’ve been here before. Akyüz argues that the post-2000 ‘swings in commodity markets show strong correlation with those in capital flows’ to developing and emerging markets (DEEs) and with it  ‘the exchange rate of the dollar’. After rising constantly, both commodity prices and flows declined in 2008, when falling prices triggered the exit of capital from commodity-rich economies.  Both recovered rapidly afterwards.

These factors are reinforcing with ‘greater force’ argues Akyüz, the ‘macroeconomic imbalances and financial fragility in several DEEs….Imbalances that started with the subprime bubble but were interrupted by the Lehman collapse.’

Akyüz cautions that the continued boom in commodity prices could eventually cause rampant inflation in China, which could lead to a sizeable slowdown. ‘This, together with the global oversupply built during the boom, would bring down commodity prices, and the downturn would be aggravated by an exit of large sums of money from commodity futures. This would make investment in commodity-rich countries unviable and loans non-performing, leading to risk aversion, flight to safety and a reversal of capital flows to DEEs.’ The most vulnerable of these are countries in Latin America and Africa that have enjoyed the twin benefits of global liquidity and the boom in commodity prices. They could be hit twice – by falling capital flows and commodity prices, he argues. South East Asian economies are less vulnerable, because they have built up substantial current account surpluses and large stocks of reserves.

Akyüz concludes correctly that these unstable capital flows and commodity price booms show that ‘the international monetary and financial system needs urgent reforms’. He quotes Ben Bernanke’s speech to the Banque de France in February, 2011:

“Looking back on the crisis, the US, like some emerging-market nations during the 1990s, has learned that the interaction of strong capital inflows and weaknesses in the domestic financial system can produce unintended and devastating results. The appropriate response is…to improve private sector financial practices and strengthen financial regulation, including macroprudential oversight. The ultimate objective should be to be able to manage even very large flows of domestic and international financial capital in ways that are both productive and conducive to financial stability.”

Fine words indeed. But words are not enough. Akyüz argues that ‘macroprudential regulations, as usually defined, would not be sufficient to contain the fragilities that capital flows can create’. Instead, controls over both inflows and outflows should be part of the arsenal of public policy, used as and when necessary and in areas and doses needed, rather than introduced as ad hoc, temporary measures.

And we do not have to re-invent the wheel. ‘The instruments are well known and many of them were widely used in the advanced economies during the 1960s and 1970s.’

While politicians, economists and regulators may be more alert than they were in advance of the 2007-9 slump, they remain submissive to a global banking lobby and passive at the wheel of the global economy. This leaves commodity speculators unfettered by regulation and free to steer the global economy towards another financial precipice. Only this time central bankers and governments will have fewer tools and resources (i.e. taxpayer largesse) available with which to rescue bankers and speculators from their reckless and worthless endeavours.

Nevertheless, soon after this coming crisis – which will again cause massive economic failure and dislocation, intense human suffering and pain – controls on capital flows will finally be applied. Be sure of that. But by then, it will be too late.

This article was simultaneously posted on PRIME (Policy Research in Macroeconomics).

With a backdrop of bankers looting the EU’s Treasuries (via a bailout that rivals George Bush’s TARP) let us consider one of the most significant Dem-Con appointments (and a non-appointment) to the British cabinet.

That of someone who until now was invisible: David Laws the new Chief Secretary to the Treasury.

His Wikipedia profile (updated on the day of his elevation, and before he had taken up his ministerial responsibilities) depicts him as the man that speaks for his party on matters relating to kiddie-winkies and families and, no doubt, motherhood and apple pie.  He is also commended for his conciliatory role in negotiating the Scottish Parliament coalition.

No mention here of his real background.

For, according to ePolitix, David Laws was once Vice President of JP Morgan and Co and based in the United States, before becoming Managing Director of Barclays de Zoete Wedd in 1992.

Now, in my book the most obvious candidate for the job of Chancellor, or Chief Secretary to the Treasury,  was surely Vince Cable, a man credited for his prescience in predicting the financial crisis, respected for his ongoing analysis of that crisis and regarded as a “scourge of City ‘fat cats’.”

Why was he shunted across to the toothless Department of Business, Innovation and Skills? And why was a man who until now has had absolutely no record of speaking out on the financial crisis, elevated to a powerful post at the Treasury?

Could it be that Vince Cable is unacceptable to the City? That he was likely to threaten the oligarchical role of the British banking community, and their grip on the UK Treasury?

Evidently so. What else can explain the Financial Times’s headline (under a picture of David Laws and the Old Etonian) “Coalition softens stance on banks” (FT 13 May 2010).  And the comment that “proposals for banking reform announced by the new coalition government appear to take a much more measured approach to the task of reshaping Britain’s bloated banking sector”.

So be afeared.

While most economists recognise (as does the FT’s Martin Wolf) that “the source of the government debt…. is the past profligacy of large segments of the private sector, and in particular the financial sector.” (FT 12 May 2010) yesterday’s Dem-Con coalition statement argued to the contrary. Government debt, according to our new political masters, is the result of “Labour’s financial crisis’ – with the City of London blanked out.

This framing of the debate is deliberate, and Labour was profoundly unwise, and irresponsible, for allowing it to pass unchallenged during the election campaign.

Because this devious framing of the causes of the financial crisis was at the heart of the Conservative election campaign strategy. And even while the Tories hid George Osborne away in a cupboard for the full duration of the election campaign, the framing of the issue remained central to their strategy. The role of the City of London was completely ignored, and the entire financial crisis laid at the door of the government, and the innocents dependent on, and working for, the public sector.

It was the most dishonourable and deceitful sleight of hand in modern British politics, I would contend.  And sadly, both Labour and too many of the British public bought into this framing of the debate.

So the ground is now laid. Bankers are preparing to move from looting Treasuries in the US and EU – to once again looting the British Treasury.  And as Michael Hudson argues, to shift the burden of taxation from property and finance – back on to Labour.

Less public money spent on welfare and jobs, means more money for bank bailouts.

Labour’s claims for jobs, for healthcare and pensions will be subordinated to claims by the banks “to get fully paid on hundreds of billions of dollars of recklessly bad loans… reduced to junk status.”

With a totally inexperienced and economically inept Old Etonian in charge: with David Laws playing the role of decoy in this proposed Great Bank Robbery, and aided and abetted  by subservient economists, the Treasury remains within the firm grip of Britain’s most powerful oligarchy.

What is at stake is not just ‘savage cuts’ inflicted on the innocent and the vulnerable, shocking though such an injustice will be.

What is at stake is nothing less than Britain’s democracy, and the peoples’ right to control over the nation’s finances.

My latest Huff Post blog

Britain’s political elites are doing deals this weekend, trying to form a government. Gingerly making their way across the shifting tectonic plates of public opinion; wary of being tripped up again by voters.

For, let’s face it, the British electorate are no fools.

As the governor of the Bank of England apparently warned last week, they are mad as hell. Austerity measures will not be tolerated, and will keep any governing party out of power for a generation .

So there is a lot to lose.

Voters listened carefully last autumn as David Cameron, the leader of the Conservative Party and his Finance Minister, George Osborne turned a blind eye to the reckless behaviour of the City of London. They ignored the extent to which taxpayers had bailed out private bankers, and taken the full burden of their losses on to the public sector balance sheet. Instead Osborne implied that responsibility for economic failure lay with millions of public sector workers, and the essential services they provide.

In a politically disastrous move, Osborne threatened to punish the innocents with a ‘new Age of Austerity’ , while promising to give an inheritance tax break to the 3,000 richest families in the country. He vowed “to freeze the pay of millions of public sector workers, cut benefits enjoyed by the middle classes and cap civil service pensions at £50,000 a year.”

As a result, and despite the fact that Conservatives were at that point 17 points ahead of Labour and headed for a landslide – their vote slumped.

Canny British voters refused to behave like turkeys voting for Christmas, and steadily withdrew support.

There then began a concerted effort to silence Osborne (it seems he was locked up in a cupboard for the duration of the election campaign). Nevertheless, the damage was done, and the Tories failed to muster a majority of seats in the House of Commons last Thursday.

Labour, under the leadership of Gordon Brown and to the surprise of many, managed to staunch the political wounds inflicted earlier on his party by his predecessor, Tony Blair. 13.5 million had voted for Labour in 1997 – in good faith. By 2005 and during ‘the good times’ when Britain was growing at 3% per annum – Labour’s vote had plummeted to 9.6 million – which is why Blair had to go. He had lost the Labour Party 3.9 million voters.

Then, just as Gordon Brown took over the premiership, ‘the world economy fell off a cliff’.

Economic failure, unemployment and the failure to rein in bankers cost Brown’s government about 900,000 votes last week – fully 3 million votes less than were lost under Tony Blair.

In other words, Labour’s lost voters were lost long before 6th May, 2010.

Sceptical of the Conservatives and fed up with Labour, voters turned their attention to the ‘new boy’ on the block – Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats.

Excited by the media spotlight, the inexperienced Clegg blundered, fell victim to hubris, and asked incredulously how Mr Brown could “squat” in No 10 even if Labour came third in the popular vote.

In the event it was Mr Clegg’s Liberal Democrats that trailed in third place.

As quickly as they had risen, his party’s hopes were dashed – thwarted by shrewd voters.

Nevertheless, Cameron and Clegg have grabbed the post-election spotlight, and are doing deals behind closed doors to forge a coalition, and force out Brown.

Many expect the negotiations to fail, for want of common ground – on for example, the cancellation of the Trident nuclear submarine, and electoral reform. So power-sharing is doomed to fail, if not this week, then by this autumn.

In the meantime, the real deal-makers are to be found elsewhere.

Across the Irish Sea . In Belfast, Northern Ireland.

The fact is that none of the political parties can afford another election campaign for the next year or so, and the Lib Dems and Tories are too far apart for a sustainable power-sharing deal. Cameron knows this. So expect the Conservatives to put in calls to the 8 members of the Democratic Unionist Party, in the hope that their support will enable David Cameron to govern as a minority government.

This way they would keep both Labour and the Liberal Democrats at bay.

That is, if they are not dislodged by the tectonic plates of ‘austerity’ – that could keep Conservatives out of power for the next generation.