This week I appeared on Newsnight with Gillian Tett of the FT and Louise Cooper of BGC Partners. We discussed our graphs of 2011 (see mine below) and wider questions around the global financial crisis this year – and how ecnomists and policy makers need to respond.

Watch the show on iPlayer for the next 5 days here. Our discussion begins at 33 mins.

Below is my slideshow from the talk:

While I was in Australia I recorded this interview with ABC’s daily show. This went out on 15th September. Watch it above or on ABC’s website here >

Wall Street plummeted as concerns over European debt and the US economic downturn spurred a broad sell-off. Photograph: Shen Hong/Xinhua Press/Corbis

Read my article from Guardian Cif, Friday 19th August:

As bank shares and stock markets plummet, and investors flock to the safety of government bonds; as obstinate EU leaders crucify their countries in a futile struggle to defend today’s equivalent of the gold standard; as British and American politicians adopt austerity policies and drive their economies closer to the cliffs of depression; and as most professional economists stand aloof from the escalating crisis – what lies ahead for ordinary punters like you and me?

First, let’s take look at the big political picture. This crisis is already sharpening the divide between left and right in both the EU and the United States. Studying a precedent – the implosion of the 1920s credit bubble in 1929 – we note that four years after that crisis erupted, the political divide sharpened decisively. The United States and Britain moved to the left. Germany chose a different path. After 1930, Germany’s Centre party under Chancellor Brüning adopted austerity policies that resulted in cuts in welfare benefits and wages, while credit was tightened. At the same time the German government engaged in wildly excessive borrowing from the liberalised international capital markets. The ground was laid for the rise of fascism.

Four years after the “debtonation” of August 2007, our political classes in both the EU and the US have consciously declined to restrain out-of-control finance sectors or to fix broken, effectively insolvent banks. Instead, central bankers deployed taxpayer-backed resources (quantitative easing) to finance, guarantee and bail out bankers who then went on a wild, speculative spending spree.

At the same time, politicians imposed austerity on the more socially useful and productive sectors of the economy, both public and private. In both the EU and US these economic strategies have angered the populace and emboldened the right; in particular the far right. Looking ahead through the political lenses of austerity, street rioting and Tea Party obstructionism, the signs are ominous.

And then there is the impact on our own living standards. For comparisons and precedent, we need only look at Japan. Our politicians and central bankers have not learned from Japan’s crisis, which preceded our own. We are, therefore, destined to follow Japan’s disastrous record of lost decades of economic activity. As in Japan, so here: a broken banking system, crushed by the weight of unpayable debts on its balance sheet, fails to lend to businesses at affordable rates. Pretty soon this constrains investment. First-time buyers can’t get affordable loans or overdrafts, placing downward pressure on property prices.

A fall in investment is compounded by government policies for austerity – rises in VAT, and cuts in public spending. These policies trigger a rise in unemployment. Rising unemployment causes people to snap their purses shut, placing even further downward pressure on prices, profits, wages and employment. The downward spiral is then hard to arrest.

Property prices across Japan have continued to slide uninterrupted for nearly two decades. Hard though it may be for us to accept, it is not impossible to imagine UK property prices falling for the next two decades.

Just as here, Japan’s politicians and central bankers exaggerated the risks of inflation, reflecting the concerns of bankers and creditors – who fear inflation will erode the value of their outstanding loans. And so they were slow to a) use monetary policy to help the broader economy recover, and b) to restructure banks. The primary Keynesian tools for reversing the Great Depression were an aggressive monetary policy combined with extensive restructuring of the banking system.

While Keynes is largely defined (by his enemies) as a fiscal activist, he was first and foremost a monetary economist. In other words, he believed that if governments and central bankers would only fix the money system – by lowering rates of interest for all borrowers (not just the banks); by injecting QE into productive, socially useful projects; and by restructuring the banking system – the rest of the economy could be helped to recover.

Because our politicians and central bankers have so firmly rejected these lessons, prospects don’t look good for us at all. Instead, we would do well to echo Frank Zappa’s realism: “I mean to say that every day/Is just another rotten mess/And when it’s gonna change, my friend/Is anybody’s guess.”

I appeared on Al Jazeera’s ‘Empire‘ on Thursday evening – hosted by Marwan Bishara, the panel was made up of myself, Dr. Georges Corm (former Lebanese finance minister and former special consultant), World Bank Professor Alex Callinicos (director of European Studies, King’s College London and author of ‘Bonfire Of Illusions’) and Dr Mario Blejer (former governor, Argentine Central Bank and former advisor, Bank Of England).

Click here to watch the hour long special >

“Marwan Bishara asked: will the International Monetary Fund regain its influence and reshape its role?

“The world is undergoing seismic economic changes, from the international financial crisis to the shifting balance of power between developed and developing countries.

“In this new world order the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the most prestigious and powerful international economic organisation on the planet, is reduced to a mere advisor, even spectator.

“This bastion of capitalist ideologies and neo-liberal policies is coming under attack from all sides.

“The developing world accuses the IMF of exploitation and favouritism, and the current scandals have only added to their woes. And the developing world refuses to be treated by the IMF as if was merely developing.

“But in the last three years the global economy has shifted and the old divides between east and west, north and south have become blurred. Many nations are looking at what the fund has to offer and are increasingly saying, “Thanks, but no thanks.”

“The IMF talks about reform, but is it empty rhetoric? Will it or can it change to reflect the new reality?

“And more importantly, with bailouts, defaults and rich nations living in a state of permanent crisis, are the IMF’s free-market policies part of the solution, or just perpetuating the problems?

“Empire asks: do we still need the IMF?”

Watch the show here >

Tonight, Wednesday 3 August 2011 at 08.00pm BST (GMT +1), BBC Radio 4 will broadcast a debate which took place at the London School of Economics (LSE) on 26 July.  This broadcast will be repeated on Saturday, 6 August, at 10.15 p.m BST (GMT +1).

Along with my colleagues Prof. Victoria Chick and Douglas Coe at PRIME  we have written the following response to the debate:

Debaters considered whether Keynes or Hayek had the solution to the present financial crisis. The economist George Selgin and philosopher Jamie Whyte spoke for Hayek; Keynes’s biographer Robert Skidelsky and the economist Duncan Weldon spoke for Keynes.

On the one hand we are pleased that the BBC and the LSE now acknowledge rival positions to the present austerity policies of Western governments. On the other  we are concerned that the debate might have served mainly to reinforce existing prejudices, rather than to clarify the substance of the matters under discussion, matters which – there can be no doubt – are of the most profound importance.

Lord Skidelsky provocatively but justly reminded the audience that in the early 1930s, the same orthodoxy driving western austerity policies directed the actions of Germany’s 1931 Bruning government and paved the way for the rise of Nazism. These actions – vigorously opposed by Keynes – were the final straw for a Germany crushed by defeat and the disastrous boom-bust cycle that followed their return to the gold standard. Reparations were easily circumvented by wildly excessive borrowing from financial interests around the world, in a manner that even Keynes did not anticipate. It was these financial and fiscal policies that brought Hitler to power.

With financial interests still firmly in the ascendency and reactionary right-wing forces increasing their grip in the United States and much of the Western world, we must not forget these lessons from history, which formed the background to the original debate between Keynes and Hayek themselves. The stakes are high indeed.

Keynes shared with Hayek a preference for the economy to be primarily the province of the private sector. However, he recognised that ‘the market’ did not always best serve the common good and therefore that state intervention was necessary – and not just during a slump. In this he was diametrically opposed to Hayek.

For Keynes, the market’s major flaws were rooted in monetary arrangements that favoured speculation and excess consumption rather than productive activity. In addition, in a slump, the pessimistic outlook of producers and investors allowed the slump to persist and needed the stimulus of public works expenditure.

The LSE debate neglected the subtleties of the respective positions of Hayek and Keynes and reinforced many of the most common and most dangerous fallacies about Keynes’s contribution – and even established some new ones.  While both economists were misrepresented to some extent, our main concern must be to rectify distortions about Keynes. There are eight misrepresentations that we want to bring out.

1.   Hayek as “an opponent of financial excess”

From 1971 through the early 1980s, restraints on the financial sector were steadily unwound. These actions were prompted by Hayekian ideals of liberalism, as is well known.  The Hayek supporters at the LSE debate dissociated themselves from this liberalisation, the cause as we now know, of the rapid expansion of the money supply before the crash. Hayek might not have predicted this consequence of liberalisation, but its disastrous consequences are now plain to one and all. Perhaps this is why the debaters dissociated themselves from this aspect of Hayek’s position. Instead they castigated the conduct of the liberalisation policy rather than the policy itself. Indeed the ideal of liberalisation was scarcely mentioned, for to do so would be to acknowledge the existence of an alternative: Keynes’s managed financial system.

2.   Keynesian policy as “promoting the big state”

Keynes’s most substantial legacy was a financial system managed by the state.  This system prevailed from the end of the gold standard until the 1970s. This management ensured that on the one hand low long-term interest rates facilitated both private and public sector investment; on the other, restraints on

banks and capital mobility kept speculation and excessive consumption at bay. Keynes had devised and helped implement a financial system that was conducive to production and investment rather than speculation and consumption.  A larger state rightly prevailed than in the 1920s or 1930s, but ironically Keynes’s state was still smaller than the state that prevailed after the counter-revolution of financial liberalisation

The post-war world was one in which the state and the private sector operated powerfully in tandem, supported by a greatly revised monetary architecture.

As we have stressed, Keynes was concerned mainly with the effective operation of the private economy.

3.   The inflation of the 1970s as “the fault of Keynesian policies”

The inflation of the 1970s began just after the Keynesian post-war mechanisms for the regulation of finance started to be dismantled. In Britain, controls on banking and capital mobility were relaxed, and liberalised arrangements were restored, beginning with Competition and Credit Control (1971) (evaluated as “all competition, no control” by most economists). The root cause of the inflation of the 1970s was the massive expansion of the money supply that followed the deregulation of credit control, as both Friedman’s monetarism and Keynes’sGeneral Theory, Ch. 21, predict.

The inflation of the 1970s was not the consequence of Keynes’s policies but of the dismantling of his policies for restraining the finance sector. In the past, the inflationary 1970s would have been understood as a ‘bankers’ ramp’.

4.   Keynes as “advocate of deficit spending”

While the importance of Keynes’s monetary policies is scarcely recognised, even his fiscal policies are severely misrepresented. Most prominent and pernicious of all is the idea that he advocated deficit spending. From his earliest contributions to the debate on fiscal policy, Keynes was concerned to establish how public works expenditure would pay for itself and would constitute a relief rather than a burden to the public finances. As we have shown in ‘The economic consequences of Mr Osborne’,[i] the outcomes of public expenditure policies over the last century vindicate his analysis. It remains a puzzle why even Keynes’s most ardent champions neglect the evidence.

5.   Keynes as “a supporter of wasteful expenditures”

Aviva has brought together a collection of prominent thinkers to provoke renewed debate and fresh ideas about future prosperity and creating a culture of sustainable savings. The group, names the ‘Future Prosperity Panel‘, published their report ‘Big picture thinking – Towards sustainable savings’.

My article is called ‘Savings and the alchemy of credit’ and is published alongside valuable work from Alain De Botton, Simon Tay, Paweł Świeboda and Diane Coyle.

Read a summary of my essay on the Aviva site and watch a video interview with me here… >

The austerity brigade is rattled. Young Daniel Knowles over at the Daily Telegraph is so worried, he has had to rise to the defence of the Treasury and Office for Budget Responsibility – and then resorts to proposing Greece’s economic strategy for the UK. Why? Because orthodox economic ideology has been challenged by none other than Daniel’s ‘hero’ that notorious womaniser, President Bill Clinton.

Bill gets it. On the deficit that is.  Thanks to Left Foot Forward and Mehdi Hasan we have all read Clinton’s  speech:

“(the) UK’s finding this out now. They adopted this big austerity budget. And there’s a good chance that economic activity will go down so much that tax revenues will be reduced even more than spending is cut and their deficit will increase.”

Daniel Knowles challenges his hero, on these grounds:

1. “The government cannot spend so much that net revenues actually increase. By Clinton’s logic we should increase spending until our deficit goes away. ”
2. “The Office of Budget Responsibility..using a Keynesian model, estimates that the fiscal multiplier is about .35”……that means that…overall the deficit is will be smaller than it would have been without cuts….. (Note: Knowles Update:  I actually made a mistake with that statistic – 0.35 is the estimate for the multiplier for VAT. Estimates of the fiscal multiplier overall, including those of the OBR, IMF and others, are closer to 0.)
3. Greece: spending cuts have reduced the deficit from 15.4% of GDP in 2009 to 9.5% now.

The first two points are rightly, morphed together in Knowles’s argument. The first is to do with the impact of government spending. In a slump – which we are living through now – it is vital for the government to spend to fill the investment vacuum created by an over-indebted and extremely nervous private sector, desperately trying to de-leverage its debt. Right now the UK private sector is busily hoarding cash, because they are – rightly – worried about their levels of debt; and because they fear – rightly – that if they do invest, customers (both private and corporate) will not walk through the door – because customers too, are heavily indebted and worried about the threat of unemployment and falling house prices.

So given these circumstances of widespread fear and paralysis in the economy – what the ONS calls ‘flat-lining’ –  say the government invests £1 billion in libraries. What would happen next?

The Office for Budget Responsibility has adopted a model of the economy with a ‘multiplier’ – which is supposed to tell us how much the government would get in return for that investment. The OBR, according to Knowles, reckons the return would be a measly 0.35 on VAT, 0.0 on government spending overall. This model implies that an investment of £1billion in an investment in e.g.  libraries, would return nil to the Treasury. In other words, the multiplier delivers a negative return: a lot less than the £1 billion invested.

The OBR model, Daniel Knowles, is most definitely not Keynesian. In fact it is an insult to the work of Keynes and Richard Kahn – who developed the multiplier - to describe it as such. It is the very reverse of what Keynes and Richard Khan argued (for more see appendix 1 of ‘The Cuts Won’t Work‘)

For Keynes, the multiplier at the very least must be 1. That is, it must return, at the very least, £1 billion to the Treasury. This will happen because, for example,  private contractors will be hired to build the library. They will buy bricks from a supplier, who will pay taxes to the Treasury on the profits he makes from selling bricks. The construction company will pay taxes on the profits they make from building the library. And their employees will pay taxes on their income – generated by working on the library build. Then the employees may e.g. walk into  a home insulation company, and buy home insulation – to ensure greater energy efficiency at a time when gas prices are rising. The home insulation company will pay taxes on that – and employ more people to insulate homes – all of whom will be on PAYE (unless evading tax). They too, will use their income to walk through the doors of heavily indebted companies….and so on.

At the same time, the Treasury will stop doling out dole money to unemployed construction and home insulation workers.

So for Keynes and Kahn the multiplier could be at 2. In other words, with public works expenditures the Treasury could expect to get £2 billion back (in tax revenues and reduced unemployment benefit payments) for their investment. This explains why government spending, unlike the spending of an individual or company, could pay down the government’s monthly ‘overdraft’, the deficit, and in time pay down the government’s ‘mortgage’ – the public debt. Our paper, cited above, provides evidence from records of the national accounts that this is precisely what has happened in the past.

Now I don’t understand why the OBR has set the multiplier at 0.0 – and indeed will write to Robert Chote, head of the OBR to seek clarification. But anyone can see how helpful such a low multiplier is to the argument about austerity. An investment of £1billion that generates a negative return – i.e. costs the Treasury without any hope whatsoever of a return – explains precisely why the government can’t be bothered to invest in  libraries, or energy efficiency or de-carbonisation of the economy.  All of these investment could revive the economy….but why should the government bother to try and revive the economy, and with it the private sector – at a negative of return for government expenditure on public works? A return which does not even pay for the investment – and indeed is modelled not to pay for a return on the investment.

That’s not to deny that there are circumstances in which the multiplier may not work. If government spending goes into tax cuts – and if consumers choose not to spend those tax cuts – then returns to government may well be negative.  And if government spending – is invested in say, Siemens, Germany – it will leak out of the country, and returns on British public investment will go to the German government, not the UK government. That is a risk, and may explain why the OBR’s multiplier is negative. They don’t expect government to invest in Britain.

But if the investment goes into public works here in the UK – productive expenditure that improves our quality of life, employs people, generates income both for the private sector, the employed, but also for government – AND reduces the deficit – why on earth should it not do that?

Finally the unlikely point made by Knowles that thanks to cuts in government spending,  the deficit is falling in Greece.

Frankly, I can’t get my head around Greece’s numbers for its deficit – which are continuing to be revised up by actors such as the EU.. First of all, as is well-documented, with the help of Goldman Sachs and with officials at the EU and the ECB turning a blind eye, the previous Greek government ‘cooked the books’. They lied about their deficit – and hid parts of it in complex products invented for them by the bankers at Goldman Sachs. So before 2009 they claimed that the deficit was 5% of GDP. When finally EUROSTAT/ the EU/IMF got their act together and looked at the books, they estimated the deficit at 15%. Since then it has apparently come down to 10%. I find this all very dodgy.

Second: remember the government deficit can be compared to an overdraft. The public debt can be compared to a mortgage. (Although please: there is no way that government spending can be compared to individual or even corporate spending; that we can draw macroeconomic conclusions from microeconomic reasoning!)

But just for illumination: Greece’s ‘overdraft’ or deficit will, of course, be volatile. Large sums of money are being transferred by the ECB and other institutions into the government’s bank account to help with the crisis. At that point in time the ‘overdraft’ will look good. But it’s the ‘mortgage’ that we should worry about, and whether or not the ‘mortgage’ is being paid down or rising.

It’s the economy stupid.  The deficit will only recover, when the Greek economy recovers. And not before. If the ‘overdraft’ or deficit gets a boost from a one-off deposit – is that helping the Greek economy recover, so that government can collect tax revenues from an active private sector and pay down both the deficit and the debt?

Right now, I am not in a position to tell why the Greek deficit has apparently fallen. But to be honest, my major concern is whether the economic recovery in Greece is in place, and is sustainable over the long term.

And I suspect that even Daniel Knowles can see what I can see: Greece is going downhill….Is that really the model Britain should follow?

This article was simultaneously posted on LeftFootForward and PRIME >

Unemployment poster ‘jobless men keep going, we can’t take care of our own’, 1931.

We write to encourage you – to urge you on in your resistance.

In your defiance, you understand Greece is slave to the interests of private wealth.

You must understand too that it is private wealth that needs Greece. Greece does not need private wealth.

As is obvious to you – if not to EU finance ministers – Greek and other EU taxpayers are asked to shore up the immense wealth and reckless lending of private French, German, British and American banks.

Without your taxes, your sacrifices, the privatisation of your government’s assets, these bankers once again face Armageddon – as they did in autumn of 2008.

Just as then, so now they have rushed behind the ‘skirts’ of their defenders at the IMF and the EU. On their behalf, these unelected officials and some elected politicians demand that Greek and EU taxpayers shield private sector risk-takers from the consequences of their risks. The very antipathy of market principles.

In the process, the European Union is torn apart. Politicians, backed by officials, now defy the founding goals of the Community and, in the interests of private wealth, set the peoples of Europe against each other.

On 20 June, 2011 the acting Head of the IMF called for “immediate and far-reaching structural reforms, privatization, and the opening of markets to foreign ownership and competition.”

Which proves our point: private wealth needs Greece. Greece does not need private wealth.

Greece’s elected politicians have plunged the country into a spiral of decline, as austerity leads to greater economic crisis, more severe failure of public finances and social and economic hardship on a scale unknown since the inter-war years.

Is there anybody on earth who seriously believes that austerity will restore the prosperity of Greece? The idea is ludicrous.

But equally ludicrous is the idea that there is no alternative.

There is an alternative.

In reality, austerity marks the final failure of the existing arrangement between public interests and the interests of private wealth. Financial liberalisation has failed. The only way forward is a new arrangement, based on ones that have better served societies since the dawn of civilisation: since Aristotle identified the evils of usury and the barrenness of prosperity based on speculation.

The first step must be the abandoning of the Euro.

The Euro must be understood not as a currency of the peoples, but as an ideal of private wealth.

The Euro is a perversion of the greatest monies in history. These arose as a relation between people and the state. Through the institutional development of central banks, domestic banks, state borrowing, paper currency and double-entry book keeping, national monies have underpinned all of the greatest societies of the world.

Money has been aimed at the interests of society, of productive labour, and vibrant state and private activity alike.

But the Euro is a money aimed only at the interests of private wealth. It is divorced from individual nation states. Its statutes explicitly prohibit the support of state activity through money creation, while its foundation in monetarist doctrine inhibits private activity and has led to a world devoid of markets, at the mercy of large financial monopolies.

Greece must restore the Drachma

If Greece restores the Drachma, social, private and financial interests can be re-aligned; prosperity can be reignited. Issued through the central bank and domestic retail banks, the Drachma can underpin a programme of public works expenditures, and in parallel, through multiplier processes, the spending of newly earned income to revive private activity in Greece. Through the Drachma, jobs and prosperity can be restored. The expertise to facilitate such a transition exists, moreover the very nature of money guarantees precedent on which action can be based.

It has been done before – successfully

The last time the world threw off the chains of private wealth was in the 1930s. Then, Britain led the way. In September 1931, financial interests demanded high interest rates and austerity as the impact of the Great Depression hammered the people. At this point Britain, like Greece today, became defiant. The UK threw off its fetters and left the gold standard – the Euro of a century ago.

Under Keynes’s tutelage, Sterling was revived as a money managed by the Bank of England and protected from speculative and vested interest. Then in 1934, President Roosevelt freed the dollar, and with it, the people of the United States, who then embarked on the finest programme of public works expenditures known in modern history.

Great public buildings were erected, symphony orchestras established, writers were sponsored – not least John Steinbeck – fantastic murals created, swimming pools built. When, in 1935, a socialist government took power in France and freed the Franc from the fetters of the gold standard, only the fascist economies remained in thrall to private wealth.

Interrupted by war, and diluted at Bretton Woods in 1947, finance was still restrained as servant not master through the age of economic and social advance from 1945-1970.

Today, the likelihood of the UK or US once again taking this lead – and defending society from the predations of private wealth – is slim indeed. But there is no theoretical reason why the lead should not be taken by a smaller nation – like Greece.

The history of the world teaches us the ebb and flow of prosperity between nations. It would be fitting too if a new era was to arise from the cradle of western civilisation.

Certainly Greece would feel the full force of the anger of private wealth, through their allies in the media, academia and politics. But this will follow from fear – not reason.

Because Greece will show the world not only that there is an alternative, but that the alternative is very good.

Posted simultaneously on the Huffington Post >

(Photo: REUTERS / Yiorgos Karahalis )
A Greek riot policeman stands in front of graffiti written on the wall of a bank during violent demonstrations over austerity measures in Athens, May 5, 2010. Greece faced a day of violent protests and a nationwide strike by civil servants outraged by the announcement of draconian austeristy measures.

Dear readers….Recovering from ‘flu and a trip down to Hay on Wye…Thought you might be interested in this piece I have written for Prime.

“We should note recent developments in political economy, that – while understated – are, we hope, of significance. Last week, the OECD published their latest World Economic Outlook, which features chapters on each developed economy as well as an assessment of the world economy as a whole.

The report is schizophrenic. It clumsily offers an outlook of excessive optimism; makes a selective assessment of ‘risks’; but continues adherence to an economic policy doctrine that is clearly making OECD economists very uncomfortable.

While the OECD report contains the expected justifications and support for the ‘austerity’ approach, nevertheless the organisation’s ‘cold feet’ are becoming apparent, even before the full extent of austerity programmes has begun to impact. There is no better example of this unease than their approach to the UK.

The report commends UK policymakers for their “current fiscal consolidation (which) strikes the right balance and should continue.”  At the same time, OECD economists hedge their bets by urging the UK government to embark on “higher infrastructure spending (that) would lower the short-term negative growth effects of consolidation without affecting its pace.”   At a press conference last week, the OECD chief economist warned that the UK should be prepared to cool austerity in the wake of weaker growth.

In parallel, President Obama was reported as disappointing the expectations of UK policymakers by failing to endorse the Government’s approach to economic policy. While Obama has not proved the champion of the better world that we had all hoped, – he is no FDR -  his stance is important and perhaps even brave.

In the second half of 2010 the world economy began to weaken, but this is greatly underplayed by OECD economists.  Instead they point to a perceived optimistic outlook ahead. But this outlook is thinly based. We are told that financial conditions are improving: but in the UK the latest assessments of project Merlin flatly contradict such a notion.

Source: www.telegraph.co.uk. Data: BBa / BIS / Bank of England

In the real economy, world trade has retreated substantially from the relatively rapid outturns at the start of 2010. The report recognises that this is a consequence of monetary policy tightening in emerging markets and the wearing off of stimulus packages in major economies. The retraction of earlier stimulus programmes by the US and EU is rather an understatement. Stimulus has not only been withdrawn, it has been replaced by austerity.

So what are the grounds for OECD optimism?   Especially given that their economists remain obsessed by inflation as the causa causans of all possible outcomes. Their overriding fear is that inflation will cause consumers to retrench. This threat is then used to justify tighter monetary policies – which would hurt over-indebted consumers, corporates and SMEs. But unemployment is a much more important driver of consumer behaviour. Wage earners snap their purses shut in the wake of what for many millions is the reality of, and for others the threat of, unemployment. Inflation is no doubt painful to the less well-off, but from a macroeconomic perspective ‘core inflation’ today is at low levels, no matter how much the OECD tries to play it up. Watch out as inflation falls rapidly over the next few months, in line with weakening economies.

The austerity and fierce monetary strategies embarked on by governments – already burdened by losses transmitted by the private banking crisis – have been directed by the civil servants of supra-national organisations: such as the OECD and IMF as well as the global central banking fraternity. These public employees enjoy immense influence, and as the the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet indicated in a speech on 2 June, 2011 they wish to capture:

“a much deeper and authoritative say in the formation of the country’s economic policies….. A direct influence, well over and above the reinforced surveillance that is presently envisaged”

Given the ECB’s role in exacerbating the crisis in Greece (described by Nouriel Roubini as ‘throwing good money after bad – to bail out, rather than bailing in, reckless creditors….a giant Ponzi scheme”)  such “authoritative” advice  by supra-national organisations has crucified economies “in a struggle which is certain to prove futile” –  to quote Keynes.

But the OECD’s latest report hints that minds might be changing. It contains the beginnings of the admission that the world is being forced down a desperate path that has no justification in economic reason and the evidence of history. The experience of the great depression stands before us. It was only enlightened monetary policies and expansionary fiscal policy that restored the US and UK not only to health but to a position to resist reactionary forces and fascism.  The current strategy is likely to make us more vulnerable to reactionary political forces – in the EU and the US.

Some might like to celebrate the previous timid stimulus for e.g. car scrappage schemes etc, under both Alastair Darling and the Larry Summers White House.  But in the light of present events, it is clear that their approach was designed not to save society but to preserve a financial system that has palpably failed the vast majority of the citizens of the world.

We at PRIME economics have repeatedly called for something greater and more just. Perhaps the foot-shuffling of the OECD indicates recognition that imposing austerity policies at a time of global economic weakness is indeed a futile struggle – soon to be abandoned?”