While I was in Australia I recorded this interview with ABC’s daily show. This went out on 15th September. Watch it above or on ABC’s website here >

By Ann Pettifor. An edited version of this piece was published on Left Foot Forward, 14 September, 2011. This original, longer version posted 19 September, 2011. 

The game is up. The 2007-9 private banking crisis that started with the unpayable debts of the US sub-prime sector, was never over. The crisis has now moved on to include the unpayable debts of sovereigns owed to private European bankers. It is increasingly clear that there is declining political and institutional support for further private bank bailouts. The dramatic resignation on Friday 9th September of Jürgen Stark, architect of Europe’s equivalent of the Gold Standard – the Growth and Stability Pact – marks an important step in the resistance to bailouts by the ECB; in the inevitable collapse of the Maastricht Pact, and with it, the utopian vision of the neoliberal Euro.

And so the age of liberalised, de-regulated finance appears to be over – at least in Europe. That is the conclusion of investors in both Wall St and the City of London and explains the collapse of confidence in banks and the volatility of stock markets as investors rush for the exits, transferring speculative gains into the safety of government bonds.

The Growth and Stability Pact was, and is repeatedly flouted by Greece and other eurozone countries – even by Germany under Gerhard Schröder. The ECB, led by Jean Claude Trichet is also obliged to flout its terms, by effectively adopting a fiscal role – buying up the bonds of deficit countries – and thereby causing the resignation of not just Mr Stark, but also Germany’s Axel Weber.

This resistance represents a Polanyian counter-movement – however weak – which defies orthodox economists, central bankers and Haute Finance. Across the Eurozone, Europeans resist further private sector bailouts; and refuse to march like lemmings to their own destruction across cliffs of unemployment, deflation and social unrest.

The Eurozone and its economic framework was designed as a financial ‘straitjacket’; to undermine the sovereignty of Europe’s elected governments; to transfer power over financial and therefore economic policy to unaccountable central bankers; powers then enforced by ‘the invisible hand’ – ‘the markets’ – international speculators on foreign exchange and financial markets. It was also, its protagonists argued, designed to ensure peace across Europe.

But so utopian is the vision of liberalised, unaccountable finance, that it has achieved the very reverse: the divergence, not convergence of European economies; sovereign insolvency, bank failures, rising unemployment, the degradation of public services, and with it the intensification of tensions and conflict across Europe.

Regrettably we have been here before. The very same policies – and liberal finance model – were tried in the 1930s, under the Gold Standard. By 1933 their failure was complete, challenged effectively by both Karl Polanyi and John Maynard Keynes. The latter took on the responsibility of outlining and implementing a ‘Plan B’ – one which endured until overturned by neoliberals in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

So as we witness the death throes of this second experiment in liberal finance, what is today’s progressive alternative? What is the left’s Plan B?

The failure of the left to pose an alternative to liberal finance was striking both before, during and after the 2007-9 financial crisis. In the wake of the greatest financial catastrophe of our lifetimes, the loudest complaints were aimed at bankers’ bonuses, and at the failure of rich elites to pay taxes. Recently, the pro-austerity Institute for Fiscal Studies has tried to turn this into a debate about the mal-distribution of wealth.

But while these are important issues, they do not touch on the structural injustice of a liberalised financial system that is capable of wrecking the global economy; denies economic sovereignty to democratic states, and that stratifies the polarisation of wealth between rich and poor. Nor does the debate on bonuses or the addition of taxes structurally alter the role of Haute Finance as ‘stupid master’ (to quote Labour’s Employment manifesto of 1944) as opposed to ‘servant’ of the real economy.

So what should the left’s macro-economic Plan B look like? Clearly it will have to embrace both monetary and fiscal policy, with monetary policy more important in the long-run; but fiscal expansion needed immediately to deal with the collapse of employment and private sector activity.

The first element of any plan must be the careful and coordinated sequencing of both quantitative easing and fiscal expansion. This will involve the financing of a programme of public works expenditures designed not just for socially and ecologically essential projects, but also to stimulate private economic activity. Central banks are eager to supply liquidity to private bankers when they wreck both their own institutions and threaten the global economy; they should now act to supply liquidity to governments that need to stimulate economic recovery, and finance the transformation of the economy away from fossil fuels. (For more on this see ‘The Green New Deal’ co-authored by this blogger.)

Next, it will be essential to manage in an orderly fashion the massive write-off or ‘re-structuring’ of unpayable debts – to replace the current disorder of random de-leveraging by sovereigns, corporations, households and individuals. Many of these debts are phantom debts, and cannot ever be repaid. That reality must be faced. It is time for another debt Jubilee.

The third element should be the introduction by sovereign states of capital controls over the mobility of finance across borders, to strengthen democratic, accountable policy-making. In the words of Brazil’s President Rousseff, governments must protect their “internal markets.” The form these controls take will depend on local conditions and circumstances, and should be agreed by elected representatives of democratic states, with central bankers acting in the interests of domestic economies, not the proverbial ‘gnomes of Zurich’. Fourteen countries already impose capital controls, including China and Iceland; but each week new reports appear. The most recent is Indonesia which will require companies to repatriate about $33bn of foreign currency earned each year on exports (FT 9 September, 2011).

Fourth, central bankers, while regulating the creation of credit by private bankers to ensure loans are repayable, should also seek to bring down interest rates across the spectrum of lending: for safe and risky loans, short and long-term loans. Adam Posen’s recent proposal for a public bank that would make cheap loans available to SMEs should be given serious consideration. In other words, the rule should be ‘tight but cheap’ money.

Fifth, governments and central banks should be mandated to promote a) full employment and b) sustainable, localised economic activity, supporting the domestic economy – not a globalised financial elite. For just as employment makes things affordable for individuals and households so full employment will make things – including the transformation of the economy away from fossil fuels – affordable for government.

“Look after employment” as Keynes argued, “and the budget will look after itself.”

Add to the above, terms and conditions for banks bailed out by taxpayers; and a reformed taxation system and you have a coherent and plausible Plan B. Correct me if I am wrong, but so far it seems the most comprehensive one on the table.

End

I appeared on Al Jazeera’s ‘Empire‘ on Thursday evening – hosted by Marwan Bishara, the panel was made up of myself, Dr. Georges Corm (former Lebanese finance minister and former special consultant), World Bank Professor Alex Callinicos (director of European Studies, King’s College London and author of ‘Bonfire Of Illusions’) and Dr Mario Blejer (former governor, Argentine Central Bank and former advisor, Bank Of England).

Click here to watch the hour long special >

“Marwan Bishara asked: will the International Monetary Fund regain its influence and reshape its role?

“The world is undergoing seismic economic changes, from the international financial crisis to the shifting balance of power between developed and developing countries.

“In this new world order the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the most prestigious and powerful international economic organisation on the planet, is reduced to a mere advisor, even spectator.

“This bastion of capitalist ideologies and neo-liberal policies is coming under attack from all sides.

“The developing world accuses the IMF of exploitation and favouritism, and the current scandals have only added to their woes. And the developing world refuses to be treated by the IMF as if was merely developing.

“But in the last three years the global economy has shifted and the old divides between east and west, north and south have become blurred. Many nations are looking at what the fund has to offer and are increasingly saying, “Thanks, but no thanks.”

“The IMF talks about reform, but is it empty rhetoric? Will it or can it change to reflect the new reality?

“And more importantly, with bailouts, defaults and rich nations living in a state of permanent crisis, are the IMF’s free-market policies part of the solution, or just perpetuating the problems?

“Empire asks: do we still need the IMF?”

Watch the show here >

Unemployment poster ‘jobless men keep going, we can’t take care of our own’, 1931.

We write to encourage you – to urge you on in your resistance.

In your defiance, you understand Greece is slave to the interests of private wealth.

You must understand too that it is private wealth that needs Greece. Greece does not need private wealth.

As is obvious to you – if not to EU finance ministers – Greek and other EU taxpayers are asked to shore up the immense wealth and reckless lending of private French, German, British and American banks.

Without your taxes, your sacrifices, the privatisation of your government’s assets, these bankers once again face Armageddon – as they did in autumn of 2008.

Just as then, so now they have rushed behind the ‘skirts’ of their defenders at the IMF and the EU. On their behalf, these unelected officials and some elected politicians demand that Greek and EU taxpayers shield private sector risk-takers from the consequences of their risks. The very antipathy of market principles.

In the process, the European Union is torn apart. Politicians, backed by officials, now defy the founding goals of the Community and, in the interests of private wealth, set the peoples of Europe against each other.

On 20 June, 2011 the acting Head of the IMF called for “immediate and far-reaching structural reforms, privatization, and the opening of markets to foreign ownership and competition.”

Which proves our point: private wealth needs Greece. Greece does not need private wealth.

Greece’s elected politicians have plunged the country into a spiral of decline, as austerity leads to greater economic crisis, more severe failure of public finances and social and economic hardship on a scale unknown since the inter-war years.

Is there anybody on earth who seriously believes that austerity will restore the prosperity of Greece? The idea is ludicrous.

But equally ludicrous is the idea that there is no alternative.

There is an alternative.

In reality, austerity marks the final failure of the existing arrangement between public interests and the interests of private wealth. Financial liberalisation has failed. The only way forward is a new arrangement, based on ones that have better served societies since the dawn of civilisation: since Aristotle identified the evils of usury and the barrenness of prosperity based on speculation.

The first step must be the abandoning of the Euro.

The Euro must be understood not as a currency of the peoples, but as an ideal of private wealth.

The Euro is a perversion of the greatest monies in history. These arose as a relation between people and the state. Through the institutional development of central banks, domestic banks, state borrowing, paper currency and double-entry book keeping, national monies have underpinned all of the greatest societies of the world.

Money has been aimed at the interests of society, of productive labour, and vibrant state and private activity alike.

But the Euro is a money aimed only at the interests of private wealth. It is divorced from individual nation states. Its statutes explicitly prohibit the support of state activity through money creation, while its foundation in monetarist doctrine inhibits private activity and has led to a world devoid of markets, at the mercy of large financial monopolies.

Greece must restore the Drachma

If Greece restores the Drachma, social, private and financial interests can be re-aligned; prosperity can be reignited. Issued through the central bank and domestic retail banks, the Drachma can underpin a programme of public works expenditures, and in parallel, through multiplier processes, the spending of newly earned income to revive private activity in Greece. Through the Drachma, jobs and prosperity can be restored. The expertise to facilitate such a transition exists, moreover the very nature of money guarantees precedent on which action can be based.

It has been done before – successfully

The last time the world threw off the chains of private wealth was in the 1930s. Then, Britain led the way. In September 1931, financial interests demanded high interest rates and austerity as the impact of the Great Depression hammered the people. At this point Britain, like Greece today, became defiant. The UK threw off its fetters and left the gold standard – the Euro of a century ago.

Under Keynes’s tutelage, Sterling was revived as a money managed by the Bank of England and protected from speculative and vested interest. Then in 1934, President Roosevelt freed the dollar, and with it, the people of the United States, who then embarked on the finest programme of public works expenditures known in modern history.

Great public buildings were erected, symphony orchestras established, writers were sponsored – not least John Steinbeck – fantastic murals created, swimming pools built. When, in 1935, a socialist government took power in France and freed the Franc from the fetters of the gold standard, only the fascist economies remained in thrall to private wealth.

Interrupted by war, and diluted at Bretton Woods in 1947, finance was still restrained as servant not master through the age of economic and social advance from 1945-1970.

Today, the likelihood of the UK or US once again taking this lead – and defending society from the predations of private wealth – is slim indeed. But there is no theoretical reason why the lead should not be taken by a smaller nation – like Greece.

The history of the world teaches us the ebb and flow of prosperity between nations. It would be fitting too if a new era was to arise from the cradle of western civilisation.

Certainly Greece would feel the full force of the anger of private wealth, through their allies in the media, academia and politics. But this will follow from fear – not reason.

Because Greece will show the world not only that there is an alternative, but that the alternative is very good.

Posted simultaneously on the Huffington Post >

Tin produced at a Glencore plant in Vinto, Bolivia

“Experience shows that when policies falter in managing capital flows, there is no limit to the damage that international finance can inflict on an economy.”

Yilmaz Akyüz, “Capital Flows to Developing Countries in a Historical Perspective: Will the current Boom End with a Bust?”

Today, as speculation and leverage in global, financialised commodity markets reach manic levels; as we witness an ‘epic rout’ (FT 5 May, 2011) in commodity prices, and as the boom in capital flows peaks, is another crash inevitable? And is it coming soon?

I know from experience that while it may be possible to analyse fundamentals, it is always difficult to predict precisely what dynamic will trigger the next crisis, and when it will happen. Back in 2003, together with colleagues at the new economics foundation in London, and with very little funding, I assembled and edited a series of essays on the ‘outlook’ for the global economy. We titled it: ‘Real world economic outlook’, and added a subtitle, ‘the legacy of globalization: debt and deflation’. We intended the report to be annual, and to act as a counter to the IMF’s annual World Economic Outlook, which in our view was irrationally optimistic about developments in the global economy.

We were pretty pessimistic about global imbalances, and predicted a crash. Sadly, our timing was way out: the crash was four years away. It does not always help to be right on the fundamentals. Given the inevitability of the then forthcoming crash, we argued that there was once more a need for a ‘great transformation’ of the global economy. The starting point we wrote ‘will be to reverse the most pernicious elements of the ‘globalization’ experiment’ by the ‘taming of financial markets through the re-introduction of capital controls; restraints in the growth of credit; the establishment of an International Clearing Agency; and a Tobin Tax’.

Back then it was hard to talk/write about these matters – and be heard. Our cheerfully-titled report and predictions did not hit the best-seller lists. Funding for the project was withdrawn, and the project wound down. It’s major flaw? We had breached areas of economic debate that at the time were carefully circumscribed. It took the financial crisis of 2007-9 to loosen the intellectual chains to which orthodox economics had so heavily tied economic debate.   Today the Tobin Tax, or Robin Hood Tax is a high-profile issue, with some signs that EU governments are considering implementation of such a tax. (See point 8 of Euro leaders’ statement, March 11, 2011). So that taboo has been broken.

Another taboo subject then – control over capital flows (now re-designated as ‘capital flows management’ by the IMF) is now, in contrast to 2003, actively discussed, even though debate is limited to controls on inward flows. Debate on controls over outward flows – illicit capital flight that makes it so easy for corporations and elites to export their gains– are still taboo.

The big change came in February, 2010, when to the surprise of many, IMF staff accepted that ‘capital controls are part of the policy mix’. And by April, 2011, the Fund had developed a ‘framework’ to help countries manage capital flows.

This framework was promptly rejected by the G24, led by India and Brazil, for several reasons. First because the IMF was dealing with symptoms, not causes – i.e. the easy money policies of the Federal Reserve.  Quantitative easing (QE) was and is, intended to pump liquidity into the US economy; to allow funds to cascade down through the banking system, for lending to companies that would, in turn, invest in infrastructure and the creation of jobs.  Because, as Prof. Chick has noted, there is neither economic debate about the money supply, nor overt management of the money supply, there is no control over how banks deploy low-interest rate funds generated by the Fed.  US and US-based foreign banks are free to ignore the Fed’s mandate or the US administration’s priorities. Like the public utilities they effectively are, banks instead are free to draw down from the Fed’s easy and cheap money-creation – QE – to speculate, and accrue private gains in mainly developing and emerging markets (DEEs).  The IMF shows little interest in the implications for the global money supply of credit-creation by central banks and, in the view of many, turns a blind eye to these de-stabilising activities. Instead fund staff lecture poor countries on the management of capital inflows.  The G24 will have none of this, and instead demands that a light be shone on the causes of the boom in speculative capital flows.

Second, as Lesetja Kganyago, chairman of the G-24 and director-general of South Africa’s National Treasury told the Wall St Journal: the group opposed the IMF framework because the fund proposed to integrate it into its surveillance program and policy recommendations. G24 leaders – especially those leading some of the world’s biggest democracies – rightly expect to enjoy the same policy autonomy privileges usually reserved for leaders of the G8.

All of this makes a recent paper on the current boom in capital flows by Yilmaz Akyüz of the South Centre so timely, comprehensive and insightful. Akyüz is chief economist at the South Centre, Geneva and former director of the Division on Globalization and Development Strategies at UNCTAD, where he edited a range of UNCTAD’s annual reports.

Akyüz begins by noting that there have been three generalised boom-bust cycles in private capital flows since the end of the Second World War: all with devastating impacts on developing and emerging markets. The first started in the late 1970s, and ended with the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s. The second started in the early 1990s and was followed by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/8; and by defaults in Latin America and Russia. ‘The third cycle’ argues Akyüz ‘started in the early years of the new millennium and ended in the second half of 2008 with the subprime crisis. This was soon followed by a new boom, the fourth in the post-war era, which started in the first half of 2009 and is continuing with full force as of early 2011.’

Akyüz argues that this current cycle will most likely end with a reversal in the upswing in commodity prices, because commodity “markets have become more like financial markets…with several commodities treated as a distinct asset class, attracting growing amounts of money in search for profits from price movements…”

The commodity bubble began with a new financial instrument invented by Goldman Sachs – the Goldman Sachs’ Commodity Index (GSCI) – so argues Frederick Kaufman in the April, 2011 edition of Foreign Policy. Next, commodity price inflation received a boost in 1999, when the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission deregulated futures markets. “All of a sudden, bankers could take as large a position in grains as they liked, an opportunity that had, since the Great Depression, only been available to those who actually had something to do with the production of our food” writes Kaufman.   “Since the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000, there has been a 50-fold increase in dollars invested in commodity index funds.  In the first 55 days of 2008, speculators poured $55 billion into commodity markets, and by July, $318 billion was roiling the markets.”

As has been well documented, rising commodity markets have enriched the few, but impoverished millions of people. Driven in part by higher fuel costs, global food prices are 36 percent above their levels a year ago and remain volatile, the World Bank argued in a recent report: “A further 10 percent increase in global prices could drive an additional 10 million people below the $1.25 extreme poverty line. A 30 percent price hike could lead to 34 million more poor. This is in addition to the 44 million people who have been driven into poverty since last June as a result of the spikes. The World Bank estimates there are about 1.2 billion people living below the poverty line of US$1.25 a day.”

Falling commodity prices, therefore, are central to any strategy for reducing global poverty.

Have they begun to fall? As I write this (6 May, 2011) global commodity markets have been subject to what the FT calls an ‘epic rout’ “…the worst sell-off for many commodities since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, in dollar terms, the biggest-ever for Brent crude.”

While these markets may well stabilise, and be talked up (and down) again, it daily becomes clear to even the most orthodox economists that, in the real world, the global economic ‘recovery’ is very weak indeed. As that reality dawns on speculators (and long before it dawns on policy-makers) will there follow a collapse in index-traded commodity prices?

Furthermore, margin debt — the amount that speculators borrow for speculative purposes — is rising quickly, just as it did in advance of the 1929 stock market crash, the Nasdaq bubble and the subprime crash of 2006/7. Indeed, as the blogger, Cullen Roche of ‘Pragmatic Economist’ notes, margin debt is now at ‘manic levels’.   Debit balances at margin accounts skyrocketed to $20.7 billion in February.  ‘Only two other times historically have we seen leverage rise so much so fast and both times it was during a manic phase – during the tech bubble of the late 1990s and the credit bubble just a short four years ago.’

These debit balances, as an anonymous player at an investment boutique notes:

‘increase speculative volatility in things like oil, which goes from $40 to $150 to $50 to $130 over and over. Paper profits change accounts but the real economy is not theoretically affected, except that it is held hostage to this casino game of rapidly changing prices for basic materials and necessities that businesses and consumers use to make decisions. So the economy is in actuality disrupted by the casino, the casino creates no net wealth, and everyone is worse off as this charade continues.’

We’ve been here before. Akyüz argues that the post-2000 ‘swings in commodity markets show strong correlation with those in capital flows’ to developing and emerging markets (DEEs) and with it  ‘the exchange rate of the dollar’. After rising constantly, both commodity prices and flows declined in 2008, when falling prices triggered the exit of capital from commodity-rich economies.  Both recovered rapidly afterwards.

These factors are reinforcing with ‘greater force’ argues Akyüz, the ‘macroeconomic imbalances and financial fragility in several DEEs….Imbalances that started with the subprime bubble but were interrupted by the Lehman collapse.’

Akyüz cautions that the continued boom in commodity prices could eventually cause rampant inflation in China, which could lead to a sizeable slowdown. ‘This, together with the global oversupply built during the boom, would bring down commodity prices, and the downturn would be aggravated by an exit of large sums of money from commodity futures. This would make investment in commodity-rich countries unviable and loans non-performing, leading to risk aversion, flight to safety and a reversal of capital flows to DEEs.’ The most vulnerable of these are countries in Latin America and Africa that have enjoyed the twin benefits of global liquidity and the boom in commodity prices. They could be hit twice – by falling capital flows and commodity prices, he argues. South East Asian economies are less vulnerable, because they have built up substantial current account surpluses and large stocks of reserves.

Akyüz concludes correctly that these unstable capital flows and commodity price booms show that ‘the international monetary and financial system needs urgent reforms’. He quotes Ben Bernanke’s speech to the Banque de France in February, 2011:

“Looking back on the crisis, the US, like some emerging-market nations during the 1990s, has learned that the interaction of strong capital inflows and weaknesses in the domestic financial system can produce unintended and devastating results. The appropriate response is…to improve private sector financial practices and strengthen financial regulation, including macroprudential oversight. The ultimate objective should be to be able to manage even very large flows of domestic and international financial capital in ways that are both productive and conducive to financial stability.”

Fine words indeed. But words are not enough. Akyüz argues that ‘macroprudential regulations, as usually defined, would not be sufficient to contain the fragilities that capital flows can create’. Instead, controls over both inflows and outflows should be part of the arsenal of public policy, used as and when necessary and in areas and doses needed, rather than introduced as ad hoc, temporary measures.

And we do not have to re-invent the wheel. ‘The instruments are well known and many of them were widely used in the advanced economies during the 1960s and 1970s.’

While politicians, economists and regulators may be more alert than they were in advance of the 2007-9 slump, they remain submissive to a global banking lobby and passive at the wheel of the global economy. This leaves commodity speculators unfettered by regulation and free to steer the global economy towards another financial precipice. Only this time central bankers and governments will have fewer tools and resources (i.e. taxpayer largesse) available with which to rescue bankers and speculators from their reckless and worthless endeavours.

Nevertheless, soon after this coming crisis – which will again cause massive economic failure and dislocation, intense human suffering and pain – controls on capital flows will finally be applied. Be sure of that. But by then, it will be too late.

This article was simultaneously posted on PRIME (Policy Research in Macroeconomics).

I have a comment in todays Guardian on the new campaign on the Tobin Tax – the ‘Robin Hood Tax’. Click here to read the whole article:

Ann Pettifor:

“The proposed currency transaction tax (CTT) represents the tiniest grain of sand in the wheels of global, mobile capital, and places very little restraint on the movement of international capital. For that reason CTT will be welcomed, ultimately, by international financial institutions. The proposal lacks a framework of democratic, accountable governance for the disbursement of funds collected under a CTT scheme. NGOs and treasuries are debating whether funds should go, for example, to national treasuries; to the Global Fund to fight Aids, TB and Malaria, or to the UN for mitigation and adaption to climate change. Until disbursement and distribution of CTT revenues are accounted for in a democratic, fair, and transparent way, the CTT will be vulnerable to attack.”

Article Published in the Times, September 1st 2009. Photo by Jon Enoch.

Ann Pettifor predicted a painful end to the good times. Now she says that only radical action can prevent further gloom

Phil Thornton

Ann Pettifor is a member of a select club — the seers who saw it all coming. Now the economist, who predicted the credit crunch as far back as 2003, believes that the worst is yet to come unless there is radical reform of the financial system.

Six years ago she parodied the International Monetary Fund’s annual economic forecast with her own — The Real World Economic Outlook. Then, in 2006, her book The Coming First World Debt Crisis, warned that rich countries were heading for a debt crisis that would overshadow anything seen in the developing world. Both were ridiculed.

With the British and world economies languishing in the worst recession since the Great Depression and with once-mighty banks reliant on government life support, she could be forgiven for being a little smug. Not a bit of it: “No, being Cassandra is not something I wish for. I hate this role of being a gloomer and doomer, as I’m an optimist by nature. But I am very pessimistic now.”

She is dismayed that politicians have failed to seize the opportunity that the crisis has given them to embark on tough reform of the banking system. Stock markets have rebounded and house prices have stopped falling, but Ms Pettifor fears that politicians and households have started to relax prematurely.

“The economy is no longer in freefall and, as a result, there’s an enormous amount of complacency from politicians, in particular, about what will happen next. I believe politicians have given away the opportunity to restructure the banks and reconfigure the system.”

She likens Alistair Darling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to a high-wire artist. “He thinks that if he can just keep his eyes closed he will get to the other side. Yet underneath him is this vast debt that has not been cleared off the banks’ balance sheets. Many of the banks are still insolvent and this has not been addressed.”

Ms Pettifor, executive director of Advocacy International, which advises countries on debt management, made her name spearheading the Jubilee 2000 campaign to cancel the debts owed by the poorest countries. She believes that there are only three solutions to Britain’s woes: write off these debts as unpayable; convert the debt into equity; or use the benefits system to raise people’s incomes so that they can meet their debts.

She is baffled that the Government has used billions of pounds of public money to rescue the banks without insisting on any change in behaviour.

She highlights an admission by the Treasury that one company in three is paying interest rates more than nine percentage points above the base rate and is furious that banks such as Barclays feel able to offer bonuses reminiscent of the pre-crash boom. If the banks do not change their ways, she says, the Government must simply withdraw the insurance guarantees that have kept them alive.

Instead, public money should be used to bail out households and businesses threatened by bankruptcy. “The banks are not using the money productively, yet what we need is for the Government to spend more productively,” she says. “But now there is a consensus that governments should not spend any more in this crisis. That will tip us into a big depression.”

Ms Pettifor, who is a fellow at the New Economics Foundation, a left-leaning think-tank, believes that it is not too late for politicians, regulators and even bankers themselves to embrace reforms that will prevent another cycle of boom and bust. She believes that a culture of easy but expensive credit, which she blames for the accumulation of unaffordable debts over the last two decades, should be replaced with a model of “tight but cheap credit”.

“Orthodox economists talk about cheap money being the cause of the crash. But it was not cheap — subprime homeowners were paying 19 per cent interest. It was easy money that was the cause.” This, in turn, led to the massive inflation in property prices — house prices trebled between 1997 and 2007. “We over-borrowed against these inflated prices. The rollicking times were rollicking and now we are getting a bollocking.”

She was baffled by a recent letter to the Queen — from other leading UK economists — after she reputedly asked why nobody had seen the crisis coming. With a voice bordering on incredulity, she reads out a passage where the letter-writers say “inflation remained low and created no warning sign of an economy that was overheating”.

“What about asset price inflation? We repressed prices and wages but turned a blind eye to assets,” she says, adding that central bankers must monitor asset prices in the same way that they track high street costs.

But how do we achieve cheap but tight credit? In terms of tighter lending standards, it means an enhanced role for bank managers. “When I and my partner took out a mortgage in 1970s we had to see the bank manager, who went through our finances with a fine-tooth comb,” she recalls. “That’s all you need — more bank managers making an assessment of risk.”

Since she believes that high interest rates were a key cause of the crash, she says that low interest rates for loans are essential.

Her prescription for achieving cheap credit is more radical — nationalise the setting of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), which tracks the rates at which the largest banks are borrowing money from each other and is used to set mortgage and business loan rates.

She says that government intervention to keep real rates at a level at which businesses can make a profit would help to stem the rise in insolvencies that, in turn, leads to people losing their jobs and their homes.

This taps into Ms Pettifor’s long-standing worry over the “financialisation” of the economy that has allowed banks to become the “masters, not the servants” of industry at the expense of genuine entrepreneurial activity.

Future lending should be directed towards sustainable home ownership and business activity, rather than speculation.

At times her model comes close to a form of Sharia, the Muslim financial code that forbids the earning of interest. Indeed, in her 2006 book, Ms Pettifor urged society to return to the traditional religious approaches to usury as a way of curbing the excesses of capital market speculation.

The final element of her vision is a “green new deal” to create economic growth and the jobs needed to fill the “crater” of lost employment and output caused by the crash.

Ms Pettifor would take a leaf out of the Bank of England’s book on quantitative easing but would direct new money to the Government to support green projects.

Private banks could lend to the Government at low interest rates for the same effect. “The fact is that when the Government spends, the private sector is the biggest beneficiary. If the Government announces a home insulation programme, it will be the construction industry that will do it,” Ms Pettifor says.

Her forecasts of a crash have been proved right, but will her latest warnings receive a better hearing? She admits that none of the three main political parties is likely to adopt her policy prescriptions. “There is a weakness in being too far ahead of the game.”

Originally published in The Times, September 1st, 2009.

“A single day, 9 August 2007, will go down in history as ‘Debtonation Day’ – the beginning of the end of the deregulation and privatisation of finance that marks the era of globalisation.”

I wrote these words on 13 August 2007, in anticipation that the great stock-market collapse of four days earlier presaged the end of the era of neo-liberal globalisation.

So it has proved.

Read Open Democracy article>